By Marina Malenic
Development times for major weapon systems have been drawn out too far, with negative implications for both the quality of the end product and the qualifications of the Defense Department’s acquisition work force, according to a former Pentagon acquisition chief.
Paul Kaminski, an advisor to President-elect Barack Obama’s presidential campaign and Pentagon chief arms buyer during the Clinton administration, said acquisition reform is essential as the incoming administration attempts to refine and replace “something in excess of $50 billion worth of backlog in equipment that is worn out or close to being worn out” for the U.S. military.
“When I last counted, I count about 10 entities that had been set up in the last couple of years which all had “rapid fielding”…in their name,” Kaminski told reporters at a Jan. 13 Defense Writers Group luncheon.
For example, Kaminski praised the Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and several other organizations set up to develop and field badly needed equipment to soldiers quickly.
“The cycle times of the existing apparatus that we have are not sufficient to supplying the needs that we have, so we have to do work-arounds,” he said.
Long cycle times have many disadvantages, according to Kaminski, chief among them being the inability to attract top talent to the work force.
“When our cycle times in developing and fielding new capabilities are a few years, there’s an opportunity to intermingle commercial and defense technology,” he explained. “When cycle times are 20 years, anybody who hopes to work in the defense industry and maybe sometime later go into the commercial sector knows there’s not going to be a path back to the commercial sector. Because we’re going to see six generations of commercial technology fielded in that time frame, and they’re not going to be current on the skills required.”
Kaminski also lamented the cuts to the DoD acquisition work force that began under his tenure.
“When you make those kind of reductions in government work force, you don’t see the people leave that you wanted to leave,” he said. “Who you see leave is the people you didn’t want to leave. Those are people who have other good alternatives.”
In addition to work force considerations, Kaminski noted that longer cycle times lead to problems with the technology itself.
“If you don’t pass those skills off to an apprentice, I don’t care how many words you write down to describe the process, you’re going to lose the recipe,” he explained. “And loss of the recipe has led to three or four of the major space program problems I’ve seen.”
Because of the rapid equipping organizations established in the past several years, counter-insurgency technologies can be fielded to troops within weeks or months. Kaminski noted the quick turnaround time for development and production of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
He also encouraged Pentagon program managers to study the cell phone industry. Because engineers in that sector develop technology while receiving constant feedback from consumers, the desired products are delivered to the market in a timely manner.
“It is essential that the user be involved in the process of development,” he said. “Otherwise, you will not end up with the right product.”