NASA is making progress in tackling problems with programs suffering cost overruns and schedule delays, but more work remains in fixing the mess, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified.

The space agency programs have been seen as high-risk endeavors for almost two decades, and problems still plague programs, according to Christina Chaplain, GAO director of acquisition and sourcing management. She spoke before the House Science and Technology Committee space and aeronautics subcommittee.

Her comments and other critical assessments of NASA program execution capabilities came as President Obama criticized programs running over budget, specifically hitting contractors and their performance.

Chaplain cited the Mars Science Laboratory, which has had its launch to space postponed for two years at a cost of an extra $400 million. Overall, the lab that initially was estimated to have a $1.6 billion price tag now tips off at $2.3 billion.

Another case in point is the Glory mission, where costs jumped $100 million (54 percent) because of problems developing a sensor.

Similarly, Kepler, a space telescope that just launched Friday from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla., also saw costs jump by $100 million because of similar issues, she testified. (Please see full story in this issue.)

These problems hamstring NASA and its ability to fund new projects, continue existing programs and chart a course to a new space effort beyond the scheduled space shuttle fleet retirement next year, she observed.

With hard times and funding shortages, NASA can’t afford to waste time and money, she argued.

She cited 18 NASA programs costing a combined $50 billion where costs rose an average of almost 13 percent from earlier baseline costs, including one with a 50 percent increase.

Chaplain said NASA programs wind up in such difficulties because often technology isn’t mature before programs begin, design changes are made, many of the programs involve complex technology, contractors failed to perform well, and sometimes agencies didn’t work well together in pushing a program ahead.

She specifically cited the next-generation U.S. spaceship program to develop a successor to the space shuttles, the Orion-Ares system. Lockheed Martin Corp. [LMT] is developing the Orion space capsule. And various segments of the Ares I rocket to lift Orion into space are being developed by The Boeing Co. [BA], Alliant Techsystems Inc. [ATK], and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, a unit of United Technologies Corp. [UTX].

It is unclear, however, whether NASA will continue with plans to build the Ares I rocket, or instead go to using military rockets from United Launch Alliance, a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed. Former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin strongly opposed that move, saying the military lifters can’t provide what a lunar mission would require.

NASA isn’t alone in problems with its programs, Chaplain stated. Many similar problems are seen in Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs.

She also could have observed that DOD procurement programs often involve the same contractors that work for NASA.

Chaplain also cited the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, or NPOESS, for a cost increase from $6 billion to $11 billion-plus “because of challenges with maturing technologies.” NPOESS is led by Northrop Grumman Corp. [NOC], working with others, under direction of NASA, DOD and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

And the Space-Based Infrared High, or SBIRS, program that originally carried a $4 billion price tag now will come in for around $10 billion. (Lockheed, with Northrop as a subcontractor)

Most problems, she said, stem from a failure to match needs of the agency buying the hardware with the contractor’s resources and abilities. Time and cost to execute a program often were underestimated, she said.

However, another witness said this low-balling likely results from unwarranted optimism, rather than from criminal intent to mislead Congress and others. “I don’t believe intentional wrongdoing is there,” said Chris Scolese, acting NASA administrator. Rather, he said, people advocating a program become “extremely enthusiastic” about it and its chances of success.

Scolese was asked why there isn’t accountability, where someone who makes a wildly wrong cost and schedule estimate would be fired. “We do hold people accountable,” while also recognizing what it is that people may be held accountable for doing.

Sometimes, someone who provided a widely wrong estimate may be moved to another program, rather than being fired, he said.

The subcommittee hearing was the first chaired by Rep. Gabrielle Giffords (D-Ariz.), the new leader of the panel.

“Our job as Members of Congress is to ensure that NASA has the resources and tools it needs to carry out the nation’s vision for the agency, including the many tasks that we have given the agency,” she said. “With that, however, goes the responsibility of ensuring that NASA is being a good steward of the resources provided to it by our constituents. I take that responsibility seriously.”