By Calvin Biesecker
For several years after the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) decided to terminate procurement of an advanced X-ray system that would automatically detect shielded nuclear materials in vehicles and cargo containers, the agency misled Congress in its annual budget requests to continue funding the program, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I/D-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, said yesterday.
Lieberman was citing a Government Accountability Office (GAO) statement that was prepared for his committee’s hearing on strengthening the nation’s defenses against nuclear terrorism.
Noting that DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition component of the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program in December 2007, GAO analyst Stephen Caldwell said in a prepared statement that the agency opted instead to just continue research and development on the system.
However, Caldwell stated, “For fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011, DHS (Department of Homeland Security) justified annual budget requests to Congress by citing significant plans and accomplishments of the CAARS program, including that CAARS technology development and deployment was feasible, even though DNDO had made the decision in December 2007 to cancel the acquisition of CAARS.”
For example, Caldwell said, the FY ’10 and FY ’11 budget requests for CAARS mention that continued testing would lead to a cost benefit analysis, which in turn would lead to a rapid prototyping effort to be followed by a pilot deployment of the system at a port of entry. DHS also said that the even though the “CAARS technology was less mature than originally estimated, successful development was still feasible.”
Caldwell then said that, “However, DHS’s description and assessment of the CAARS program in its budget justification did not reflect the actual progress of the program. Specifically, DNDO officials told us that when they made their course correction and canceled the acquisition part of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct a cost benefit analysis because such analyses are generally needed to justify going forward with acquisitions.”
In preparing its review of CAARS, Caldwell said that DNDO officials recently stated that the budget language wasn’t clear and that they aren’t planning to do a cost benefit analysis.
Caldwell did not testify at yesterday’s hearing, which was limited to an open session with Deputy DHS Secretary Jane Holl Lute and then followed by a closed session with the new DNDO chief as well as representatives from a number of DHS component agencies.
Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), the ranking member on the committee, called into question the credibility of the DHS budget requests based on GAO’s testimony about CAARS.
“We have to be able to take at face value the information the department presents to us; otherwise, how can we proceed to evaluate the budget justification?” Collins said.
Lieberman gave DHS a week to respond to the GAO’s statement about CAARS.
Lute responded that DHS works to be open and forthright in its dealings with Congress, denying there were any efforts to mislead.
“I don’t accept at this point the characterization by GAO that we were misleading Congress, but I will provide a written answer in detail,” Lute said.
DNDO in September 2006 awarded contracts to American Science and Engineering [ASEI], L-3 Communications [LLL] and SAIC [SAI] to develop CAARS (Defense Daily, Sept. 14, 2006). At the time, the contracts were ultimately worth up to $1.5 billion combined including production. GAO said that $113 million has been spent on the project.
After the acquisition effort of CAARS was canceled, the program focused on demonstrating the maturity of the technology. Testing was completed in March 2010, although GAO said that currently test results for two of the systems are not available.
GAO cited several reasons for DNDO’s decision to terminate the production portion of CAARS. One is that Customs and Border Protection, which would be the primary user of the systems, said they didn’t want the machines because CAARS wouldn’t fit into the primary inspection lanes at ports of entry, GAO said.
There was a lack of discussions between DNDO and CBP on the requirements for the systems in primary inspection lanes, GAO said. Had the two agencies discussed the program sooner, DNDO probably would not have moved ahead with CAARS when it did, GAO said.
GAO also said that DHS’ oversight of the program was inadequate. For example, as with other major acquisitions, there was no mission needs statement and annual departmental reviews were not held as required, GAO said.
Lute said that the requirements and acquisition oversight issues have been addressed by DHS for its acquisition efforts.
Another problem for CAARS was that the automated detection capability of shielded nuclear material was technologically immature, GAO said. These detection algorithms are critical for maintaining a sufficient throughput of cargo through the systems in primary inspection mode.
Another issue at yesterday’s hearing was the status of DNDO’s efforts to develop a strategic plan to help identify gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and help guide the way forward. Lute said that it would be completed by the end of 2010, although Lieberman said that getting it done by November would “impress” the committee since the document is overdue.
Lute also said that the strategic plan, which is currently in draft form, would be followed by an implementation plan. The strategic plan as such will “outline the vision, the goals the objectives and the performance metrics,” she said. The implementation plan “will look specifically at the existing architecture and structure we have in the domestic environment, look more specifically at those gaps and identify concrete pathways, procedures, acquisition, training, techniques and other elements necessary to put that plan into full effect,” Lute added.