By George Lobsenz
The Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is deviating from its normal safety review process for nuclear weapons assembly operations to accommodate an unusually accelerated production schedule for a modified new W76 warhead at the Pantex plant, according to a federal oversight board.
NNSA, the semi-autonomous DoE agency that runs the department’s nuclear weapons complex, is accepting an “uniquely complicated operational plan” for addressing concerns about electrostatic discharge vulnerabilities during nuclear explosive operations so that production can resume in time to produce the first modified W76 warhead by the end of September, according to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), which monitors safety at DoE nuclear sites.
The board said Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex LLC, which operates Pantex for NNSA, did not identify the electrostatic discharge risks before it started W76 operations last year–and the DNFSB is not confident the contractor’s new operational plan will assure that electrical energy is not transmitted along “undesirable…paths” during nuclear explosive operations.
Further, the board questioned why NNSA was agreeing to safety short-cuts because the agency is not formally committed to producing the first modified W76 until the end of the year.
“Although NNSA’s currently documented commitment is to complete the first W76 Mod 1 production unit by the end of calendar year 2008, B&W Pantex is working to start operations…so that the first production unit can be completed by the end of September 2008,” the DNFSB told NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino in an Aug. 8 letter.
“This schedule is leading NNSA to accept a uniquely complicated operational plan as well as deviations from the design agency’s normal safety review process.”
The board asked why Pantex officials were planning to use uncertain administrative controls to protect against risks from electrostatic discharge when some buildings at the Texas plant already have been equipped with “static dissipative” flooring that effectively eliminates those risks.
“It is not clear why W76 operations should be restarted using the administrative control set, especially since B&W Pantex has already installed static dissipative flooring in four facilities to be used for W76 operations, with a fifth floor to be installed in September,” the DNFSB said.
“A [resumption of W76 operations] having some facilities operate using the administrative control set while others are operating using the dissipative environment creates a more complicated operational envelope necessitating the simultaneous implementation of separate control sets, tooling, and training curricula.”
The board said the effectiveness of the administrative controls depended on B&W Pantex identifying all electrostatic discharge scenarios–something that did not occur when the contractor initially started up W76 operations, leading to the abrupt suspension of those operations in May 2008 when new electricity-related risks were discovered.
The DNFSB said it also was concerned about the new operational plan because Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is responsible for weapons design safety, did not conduct an independent review of analyses used to support resumption of W76 operations–even though DoE regulations require such an independent review.
The board, exercising its statutory authority to demand safety explanations from DoE, asked NNSA to provide answers to address the board’s concerns, including “a description of how the operational complexity of using different control sets simultaneously in different facilities will be mitigated to ensure that no safety issues result, and an explanation of the schedule requirements that require operating in this manner.”
In addition, the board asked for “a description of NNSA’s plan to review other programs for the same hazards that led to the suspension of W76 operations and for controlling any identified hazards in a manner consistent with the controls ultimately instituted for W76.”