The 30,000 U.S. troops in Europe pose little credible deterrence to a Russian of NATO’s eastern flank, a reality trumpeted by Army commanders and backed up by a spate of recent studies that recommend at least another brigade be permanently available to defend the continent.
A determined Russian advance on the Baltics could reach the capitals of Estonia and Latvia within two and a half days, according to a recent report by Rand Corp. Army units dispersed throughout Europe would have a hard time converging to repulse such and advance and lack critical capabilities needed for such a high-end conflict.
To counter the increased strategic threat Russia poses to NATO, the Pentagon in its fiscal 2017 budget is requesting a huge boost to U.S. forces in Europe—a total of $3.4 billion, more than quadruple last year’s $789 million request. The money is earmarked for more rotational troops in the region, training and exercises with ally and partner nations, additional prepositioned warfighting equipment and infrastructure needed to counter Russian aggression.
That money should be spent to fill capability gaps found in several recent studies, including the official report by the National Commission on the Future of the Army and a more-recent study of Army forces in Europe by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Aside from a shortage of armor in Europe to specifically deter a ground invasion by Russia, the commission found “unacceptable modernization shortfalls” in aviation survivability, short-range air defense artillery (SHORAD), chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities, field artillery and Army watercraft. The commission also heard repeatedly of tactical wheeled vehicle shortages, primarily in heavy equipment and large tactical mobility trucks
CSIS found shortfalls in reliable integrated missile defense systems to defend air and ground-based assets against Russian missiles. The Russians also are adept at using unmanned aerial systems relay targeting information to artillery units.
“This is a critical capability overmatch that could potentially prevent the United States and its allies from flowing in additional forces in the event of a high-end conflict,” the CSIS study says. “[Army Europe] must improve its short-range air defense capabilities with the Avenger Air Defense System, which currently only exists in specific NG (National Guard) units–like those defending D.C.
Both reports found deficiencies in the Army’s electronic warfare, cyber and directed energy capabilities. Bridging equipment and units trained to use it are requirements uniquely important in Europe where the terrain is cut through with rivers. The Army has no bridging equipment in Europe and must instead use German bridging equipment during exercises, according to Lt. Gen Ben Hodges, Commander of U.S. Army Europe.
Hodges of late has repeated the line that he must do with 30,000 soldiers what his predecessors had 300,000 troops to do at the height of the Cold War.
“That’s the Army’s challenge: How do we make 30,000 look and feel like 300,000,” Hodges told reporters at the Pentagon last year and repeated Feb. 5 in an interview with National Public Radio.
Multiple wargaming scenarios used in the Rand study found that the longest amount of time needed for Russia to reach the Baltic capitals is 60 hours. A force of at least seven brigades, three of which should be equipped with tanks and armored vehicles, supported by air power, artillery and resupply that is ready at the outset of such a conflict could prevent such a route, the Rand study found.
“While not sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or to restore NATO members’ territorial integrity, such a posture would fundamentally change the strategic picture from Moscow,” write David Shlapak and Michael Johnson in the study, titled Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank.
Eight brigades represents a huge chunk of the Army’s available 30 brigades, only nine of which are armored units that are currently assigned rotational duties in Europe, Korea and U.S. Central Command. Adding three new brigade combat teams (BCTs) to the Army outright would be an expensive proposition at about $13 billion, the report says. But much of the necessary gear already exists, including tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.
“The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion,” the Rand report says.
The CSIS report echoes the need for an increase in sheer troop numbers in Europe, but suggests the United States could rely at least in part on allied nations for several brigades. The NCFA called at least for a permanent armored BCT to be stationed in Europe.
CSIS calls for a “tiered and scalable posture” for Army forces in Europe that would allow rapid expansion when necessary.
If Russia can concentrate about 40 battalion battle groups–units similar in size and capability to U.S. BCTs–for a full-scale conventional attack on the Baltics, the United States and its allies would need to field the equivalent of 13 BCTs to stop them, the CSIS study says.
At least five of those 13 should come from allies, three specifically from Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, CSIS says. That would leave the U.S. responsible for eight BCTs in a full-on war with Russia. The study calls for one BCT continuously rotating to the Baltics, an additional two structured as rapid response forces formed from troops already on the continent and five BCTs in the first echelon of follow-on forces from the United States.
At least eight brigades worth of equipment should be staged in Europe for those BCTs to use in case of a conflict. The Army already has equipment in place to support its two permanently stationed BCTs and on European Activity Set for use by the rotational armored BCT.
The CSIS study calls for another EAS for use by an additional rotational ABCT and an enhanced EAS for support units and four brigades’ worth of stockpiled vehicles and gear prepositioned to equip follow-on forces to speed their entry into battle against Russian forces.
The addition of another rotational armored BCT will allow for continuous presence by an armored brigade and bring the total force posture at any given time to three U.S. brigades. Army Europe would also need to add around 1,000 headquarters staff to boost command and control capabilities, the study found.