By Steven Wills, Ph.D., Defense Opinion Writer.
The U.S. recently seized a seventh Venezuelan tanker, which Washington accuses of being part of a global “ghost fleet” that surreptitiously moves Russian and Iranian oil or other illicit cargo under false flags and registry to avoid economic sanctions.
News of the seizure came on the heels of the U.S. operation to arrest Venezuelan leader Nicholas Maduro and his wife on drug trafficking charges.
The U.S. argues that seizure of the ships is legal under international and customary law. Long-standing maritime rules allow seizure of vessels at sea without a flag of registry or the right documentation to internationally travel one from nation to another.
It’s like driving without a license or flying to a foreign country without a passport. In both cases the traveler without documentation can be arrested, and that’s what happened to these seven ships.
Ghost fleets and illegal activity
There has always been illegal activity at sea, as international waters, often far from the reach of law enforcement, appear to represent a safe zone for such actions.
The New York Times offered a pointed description of what comprises a ghost fleet. They are “often aging, dilapidated vessels with opaque ownership structures designed to muddy paper trails that could indicate the origins of the oil they’re carrying. The ships often obscure their identities at sea by broadcasting and painting fake vessel names on their hulls, as well as by flying false flags. They often change their names and their flags regularly.”
A shadow fleet also relies on ship-to-ship transfers of cargo at sea and non-Western insurance to move sanctioned oil and products.
While not as overt as the famous “blockade runners” of the American Civil War that steamed boldly passed U.S. warships guarding rebel ports, these ghost vessels are just as important to the Russian and Iranian economies as they were to the rebellious Confederate states.
Ghost fleet ships carry as much as 65% of Russian seaborne oil trade. In 2025, between June and August, Iran made $10 billion in profits from oil transported by ghost fleet tankers, according to a non-profit that tracks the issue.
Not a victimless crime
Some might argue this is a victimless crime, but aging, uncertified ghost fleet ships are a far greater hazard to the ocean outside their bulkheads than many imagine.
Ghost fleet vessels often engage in other criminal activity, including the enslavement of their crews and trafficking in persons. These ships are old and often in poor material condition. They might catch fire or sink in populated areas that could result in disastrous results. Ghost fleet ships lack proper insurance credentials, so those affected by accidents end up paying rather than their shadowy Russian operators.
A 2024 Atlantic Council noted the danger associated with ghost ships:
“The Cuban-flagged tanker Petion, carrying sanctioned Venezuelan oil, collided with another vessel off the coast of Cuba. In March 2022, the Panama-flagged tanker Arzoyi ran aground off the Chinese port of Qingdao. In May 2023, the Gabon-flagged tanker Pablo caught fire off the coast off Malaysia. Malaysian authorities responded to the incident, rescued the crew (though three could not be located) and extinguished the fire. In October 2023, the 26-year-old Cameroon-flagged tanker Turba, which had its last inspection in 2017, lost engine power some 300 kilometers off the coast of Indonesia. And in December, Indonesian salvage teams had to rescue a 23-year-old Cameroon-flagged shadow vessel carrying Venezuelan oil.”
In each case, local authorities paid the costs for ghost fleet mishaps. A major oil spill or fire, especially in port, could be as disastrous as the 2020 explosion of the cargo from the abandoned Russian ship Rhosus in the port of Beirut that killed over 130 and injured over 5,000 people.
Legal case for seizure
The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has very clear language on what is required of a ship on the high seas. It states that vessels may only sail under one registered flag, and that “a ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.”
The Russians have claimed that the tanker Bella 1, the fifth tanker seized by the U.S. in early January, was in fact a Russian-flagged vessel Marinera, but official records suggest this is a deception. According to the shipping database Equasis, “the Bella 1 was previously registered in Panama, but its current registry is listed as “unknown.”
The organization United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) includes the vessel on its “ghost armada” list, indicating it is flying a false flag (from Guyana), which makes it effectively stateless. The UNCLOS Article 92 describes a ship flying more than one flag as “a ship without nationality.”
Such ships may be boarded and inspected by any warship on the high seas, according to UNCLOS Article 110. The Bella 1/Marinera certainly fits this category, even if it assumed Russian registry, as it previously was unregistered and stateless.
The U.S. is not an UNCLOS signatory but generally accepts and follows most aspects of U.N. Law of the Sea guidance. Venezuela also is not a signatory, but Russia is and is nominally affected by its provisions.
What is the end result of a campaign against illegally certified ships?
Such an effort will take away another tool of revisionist powers like Russia and Iran used to skirt sanctions imposed on both nations by a variety of countries and organizations. Making these vessels “Russian-flagged” also removes them from illegal trade by making them liable to sanctions as Russian vessels.
Removing the ghost fleet also protects the ocean environment and innocent civilians from the dangers of the often illicit or poorly stored and maintained cargo carried by ghost fleet ships. Ghost-busting the ghost fleet is a worthy mission for all seafaring states committed to law and order at sea.
Dr. Steven Wills is the navalist at the Center for Maritime Strategy. His research and analysis centers on U.S. Navy strategy and policy, surface warfare programs and platforms and military history.
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