By Ju Hyung Kim, Defense Opinion Writer.
South Korea fields world-class advanced defense systems. However, one area remains relatively underdeveloped — the electromagnetic spectrum that enables every modern operation to sense, communicate and strike. If disrupted or jammed, even the most sophisticated forces would lose their eyes and ears.
To fill the gap, Seoul is planning to deploy four standoff electronic warfare (EW) aircraft by 2034. Such a decision is not simply a procurement of military equipment but a landmark that indicates a doctrinal shift.
South Korea’s procurement of EW aircraft offers an independent means to control and contest the spectrum for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force, which was long considered to be the purview of U.S. assets.
However, such a concept may cause a political dilemma that goes beyond technology. If South Korea could independently defend and disrupt the electromagnetic domain, the argument goes, such a development could strengthen the logic of OPCON transfer, referring to the shift of wartime command authority from the U.S. to a South Korean commander.
But at the same time, premature transfer amid escalated regional instability could make the region less stable.
Rebuilding spectrum dominance
For decades, Seoul heavily relied on U.S. electronic-attack and suppression capabilities. Exploiting such an asymmetric feature, North Korea threatened allied aircraft through GPS jamming, radar-linked artillery and spoofing. Spoofing means emitting false signals to deceive enemy sensors and navigation systems. Recently, North Korea’s anti-drone and electronic deception capabilities are reportedly increasing, thanks to Russia’s support.
The primary intent of South Korea’s new EW aircraft is to upend such a trend. They would go beyond simply responding to interference and would enable Seoul to map and manipulate the spectrum—degrading enemy sensors, tracking hostile emitters and safeguarding friendly links that maintain coordinated strike packages. By projecting jamming from beyond North Korea’s ground-to-air missile range, these aircraft transform electronic energy from weakness to weaponized force.
Their greatest value lies in U.S.-Japan-ROK synergy.
Japan already has EC-2 and EP-3C aircraft and ground-based EW units that can conduct a wide range of surveillance. Yet, Tokyo lacks tactical jamming capability; such a gap could be filled by South Korea’s capability buildup. Meanwhile, Tokyo could compensate for South Korea’s lack of early warning capabilities.
If these two countries are linked to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) network, the trilateral partners could establish a spectrum defense lattice from Hokkaido, the northernmost main island of Japan, to the Yellow Sea to the west, a distance of approximately 600 miles. Such a structure would confuse potential adversaries such as China and North Korea even before they launch their missiles.
Shared threat databases, combined exercises and joint waveform libraries–shared databases of electromagnetic signal characteristics for jamming, sensing and protection—would reinforce such a structure. Moreover, if the information-sharing agreement from the 2023 Camp David summit could include spectrum coordination, ad hoc cooperation would transform into a standing deterrent—an invisible shield that covers Northeast Asia.
Transferring wartime control
Strengthened electronic warfare capabilities would inevitably influence discussions on OPCON. On the surface, the ability to independently operate within the spectrum would reinforce Seoul’s logic of OPCON transfer. However, realistically speaking, the U.S. is likely to face limitations in its command ability in a dual contingency scenario, while seamless coordination among the trilateral partners would be a necessity.
If the command system is divided under such dire circumstances, the most important element for integration—spectrum and airspace management—may encounter friction.
Therefore, a conditions-based, step-by-step OPCON transfer is a wiser approach. Before transferring command, the U.S. and South Korea should verify frequency-deconfliction procedures and compatible electronic orders of battle. They should secure cross-domain links between U.S. and South Korean EW centers, since spectrum dominance under an unsynchronized command would be a liability rather than an asset.
A solution moving forward
To institutionalize such an outcome, the three countries should establish a trilateral coordination group, which could deal with the standardization of spectrum access, coordinated joint training and the preparation of counter-jamming playbooks.
Cross-network interoperability, which allows South Korean aircraft to link directly into allied sensor grids, would shorten reaction time and accelerate targeting. Meanwhile, a unified electronic order of battle, updated in real time, could detect and suppress enemy emitters within minutes.
Although electronic warfare rarely makes headlines, it is becoming an element that decides the outcome. Where drones, precision munitions and artificial sensors rule, bandwidth is the new ammunition. In that sense, South Korea’s effort to secure spectrum superiority indicates its willingness to strengthen deterrence and keep pace with the current developments in the EW domain.
Increased capability should be paired with command-system integration. Without strategic coordination, technology could breed confusion instead of confidence. OPCON transfer should evolve alongside a common understanding of EW operations.
In an age when opponents aim to blind before they strike, deterrence depends less on firepower than on the clarity of the signals that bind allies together. By internalizing its spectrum superiority within trilateral security cooperation, South Korea is transforming the once-weak seam into a cornerstone of collective strength.
Dr. Ju Hyung Kim is president of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank in Seoul affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a forthcoming book.
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