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| Tuesday, July 1, 2025 • 67th Year • Volume 306 • No. 56 | |||||||||||||||||||
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Collins Slams Army’s Decision To Cancel Robotic Combat Vehicle The chairwoman of the Senate Appropriations Committee on Wednesday knocked the Army’s recent decision to cancel a robotic ground vehicle program that she said is a testament to the innovation the Defense Department needs on the battlefield. Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) told Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll he “should review this decision” to terminate the Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) program, adding, “I think it was terribly unfair and a real mistake.” The committee’s defense panel met to review the Army’s fiscal year 2026 budget request. The Army reportedly recently selected Textron’s [TXT] Ripsaw robotic vehicle for the RCV, which would be built by the company’s Howe & Howe Technologies business unit in Maine, Collins said. She called Howe & Howe an “innovative, brilliant firm, the kind of company that we need more of in our industrial base.” Driscoll defended the cancellation, saying the RCV became too expensive due to the Army’s usual case of adding “too many requirements,” which slowed the program and put it behind the cost curve when “an $800 drone with a very cheap munition can take out a $3 million piece of equipment endlessly.” The U.S. cannot sustain this, he said. Driscoll suggested there are less expensive ways to create autonomous vehicles, highlighting that software companies like Applied Intuition that can equip existing drive-by-wire vehicles with their technology and make them autonomous “in 10 days.” “And that’s the type of cost curve we can afford, is to go out and find things that are already being purchased by consumers and translate them over to military cases,” he said. “And so, for the vast majority of the things we need to purchase today—to counterbalance all of the exquisite things we’ve purchased in the past—we have got to be buying cheap, attributable, scalable solutions. And unfortunately for the RCV, it’s just not one.” Collins countered with three points. She highlighted that in the Army’s 250th birthday parade in Washington, D.C., last Saturday that was viewed by President Trump, Textron’s Ripsaw RCV was publicly unveiled. “It’s the height of irony that you would feature this combat vehicle in your parade as the future of the Army at the same time that you’ve canceled the contract, the cancellation of a contract that was won over a lot of other competitors,” Collins said. Second, she added, is that the RCV comes with counter-drone technology, giving it a self-defense capability against drone threats. Finally, Collins pointed out that drones are a threat to all vehicles on the battlefield, noting that the RCV is “autonomous,” which means “You’re not going to lose a soldier’s life if it’s taken out.”
Kelly Pushes Hegseth On Golden Dome Reality, Cutting Pentagon Testers
Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) on Wednesday showed strong skepticism that the wide-ranging Golden Dome missile defense initiative is realistic while also cutting the Pentagon’s independent weapons testing office that could ensure the systems work. In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Kelly argued to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth that “we’re talking about hundreds of [intercontinental ballistic missiles] on simultaneously, varying trajectories, [Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles], so multiple re-entry vehicles, thousands of decoys, hypersonic glide vehicles, all at once. And considering what the future threat might be, might even be more complicated than that.” Kelly added that while the Trump administration is proposing starting by spending $25 billion for Golden Dome in the reconciliation bill, he said the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) said this could cost upward of $500 billion while other estimates are closer to $1 trillion. Last month, President Trump announced some details of Golden Dome, including that it would have a total cost of $175 billion and be ready only within three years with a nearly 100 percent success rate. (Defense Daily, May 20). A May CBO report estimated the costs of the Golden Dome space-based interceptor constellation section alone could range anywhere from $161 billion to $831 billion, depending on its scope. “I am all for having a system that would work. I am not sure that the physics can get there on this. It’s incredibly complicated,” Kelly, a seasoned astronaut, warned. This tracks with March statements from former first Trump administration Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin, who argued boost-phase missile defense via space-based interceptors is probably not physically or technically possible, as in under a one percent chance. He said it was not worth spending money on a space-based interceptor constellation that targets a missile’s boost phase (Defense Daily, March 4). Given these challenges, Kelly pressed Hegseth on how this might hurt the initiative’s reliability when DoD is cutting most of the staff of the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the Pentagon’s top weapons testing office. He asked Hegseth if DOT&E was cut due to its plans to oversee testing of Golden Dome systems. Hegseth responded, “the concerns were not specific to Golden Dome, it was years and years of delays, unnecessarily, based on redundancies in the decision making process, that the services, COCOMS and the Joint Staff, together with OSD identified as a logjam that was not helping the process.” Kelly responded by arguing a strong weapons testing office would help make sure Golden Dome works to the ideal 99.99 percent reliability rate. “You cut the staff of the people who are going to make sure this thing works before we make it operational, before we give it to the warfighters. You’ve got to go back and take a look at this.” The senator urged Hegseth to put together a group of scientists to make sure the physics will work so the administration does not spend hundreds of billions of dollars only to “get to the end, and we have a system that is not functional, that very well can happen.” Kelly argued the idea “might not be fully baked” but they should work with non-contractor scientists and figure out what needs to be done to build a workable system, “and then make smart decisions before we spend hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars.” Hegseth dismissed Kelly’s concerns. He said the Defense Department is doing that by “leveraging existing technologies and not premising the project on aspirational technologies. What we can actually do.” Kelly replied the initial $25 billion is more than just figuring out if they have the ability to build a system that can handle the scale of the threats billed in Golden Dome.
Anduril Offers Autonomous Air Vehicles, Rocket Motors To Europe In Partnership With Rheinmetall
Anduril Industries is offering its Barracuda and Fury air vehicles to Europe through a partnership with Germany’s Rheinmetall, which will provide its digital platform that will integrate the autonomous air systems, the companies said on Wednesday. The strategic partnership also includes Anduril’s solid rocket motor capabilities for potential use in Europe. The two companies are already partnering to provide their respective counter-drone capabilities for solutions offerings, and on the U.S. Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program. The latest collaboration includes a European variant of Anduril’s Fury multi-mission Group 5 autonomous air vehicle (AAV) the California-based company is developing for the U.S. Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program to operate with advanced manned aircraft. The other AAV in the partnership is Anduril’s turbojet-powered Barracuda low-cost, expendable, multi-mission AAVs that comes in four different size and payload packages, including a munitions variant. Barracuda is designed for mass production. The companies said the systems will be jointly developed and produced, and will include local suppliers and partners throughout Europe. “This is a different model of defense collaboration, one built on share production, operational relevance, and mutual respect for sovereignty,” Brian Schimpf, Anduril’s CEO, said in a statement. “Together with Rheinmetall, we’re building systems that can be produced quickly, deployed widely, and adapted as NATO missions evolve.” Rheinmetall this year premiered its Battlesuite digital platform that it bills as a central hub for “interconnecting all actors and systems.” Battlesuite is based on an operating system called Tactical Core developed by Germany’s blackned GmbH that Rheinmetall expands with applications to integrate its products and those of its strategic partners.
Driscoll Says Details On Army Transformation Initiative Coming In June
Details on a $48 billion plan the Army is undertaking to shed investments in obsolete and low priority programs and efforts in favor of high priority needs are forthcoming in days, Daniel Driscoll, the service’s secretary, told a Senate panel on June 18. Asked by Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) about details on the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI), Driscoll said, “we’d be happy to com come by any time, but I think very specifically you will have that detail within 10 days.” The ATI was announced on May 1 and calls for cutting programs such as the AH-64D Apache helicopter, Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs), Humvees, the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle, and Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft system, and others, in addition to staff reductions and consolidations at more than a dozen commands. So far this year, when Driscoll and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George have testified before congressional panels on the service’s fiscal year 2026 budget request, congressional defense leaders have generally supported the Army’s need to transform but say they need details. Driscoll’s and George’s appearance Wednesday before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee was no different. “Congress has a constitutional obligation to provide for the common defense and to steward taxpayer dollars responsibly and we don’t serve either the taxpayer or the common defense with blank checks for vaguely defined priorities,” Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the subcommittee chairman, said in his opening statement. “We want to see the analysis behind the specific bets the army wants to place on ATI.” That analysis needs to show the impacts on the industrial base, the other military services, and allies, and how it equips the Army for a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater, McConnell said. Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) asked about impacts on the tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base from the proposed JLTV and Humvee cuts, noting that her state has more than 40 suppliers for these programs. Driscoll responded that the Army has more JLTVs and Humvees than it needs, saying they “do not provide the mobility and the empower our soldiers to be lethal in all of the environments we need to be.” The recycling of investments planned under the ATI will benefit traditional defense industrial base suppliers and the Silicon Valley-type technology innovators, he said. The Army has gaps in a lot of areas and if vendors can invest in and make things the service needs, then small, medium, and large companies “can get rewarded for those investments,” Driscoll said.
Trump Nominates Caudle As Next Chief of Naval Operations
President Trump nominated Adm. Daryl Caudle to be the next Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) this month, after removing Adm. Lisa Franchetti about four months ago. According to a congressional notification, the Senate received the nomination of Caudle on June 17, which was then referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee. A nomination hearing has not yet been scheduled as of publication time. Caudle has served as commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command since late 2021, having succeeded Adm. Chris Grady, who at the time was being nominated as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a role he still holds (Defense Daily, Dec. 9, 2021). Before leading Fleet Forces, Caudle had numerous positions in submarine forces. Earlier in his career he was commanding officer of the USS Jefferson City (SSN-759) and as deputy commander of Submarine Squadron 1 he served as commanding officer of USS Topeka (SSN-754) and USS Helena (SSN-725) due to emergent losses of the normally assigned commanding officers. He also commanded Submarine Squadron 3. Later on, Caudle served as commander of Naval Submarine Forces; Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and commander of Allied Submarine Command. Caudle also has experience as vice director for strategy, plans and policy on the Joint Staff (J-5); commander of Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and commander of Submarine Group Eight. Trump abruptly fired Franchetti and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. C.Q. Brown in February with no reason given, which led to Adm. James Kilby, Vice CNO, to become acting CNO (Defense Daily, Feb. 24). Kilby will remain as Acting CNO until Caudle is confirmed by the Senate. Relatedly, the administration is still waiting for the Senate to schedule a nomination hearing for Hung Cao, Trump’s pick for the second highest civilian spot in the Navy Department, under secretary of the Navy (Defense Daily, Feb. 28). After serving in several military positions leading up to the rank of captain, Cao ran for and lost a 2022 bid for the Virginia 10th congressional district to incumbent Rep. Jennifer Wexton (D-Va.).
DoD CIO Official: Satcom Needs its ‘3GPP Moment’
Satcom leaders at the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) are pushing to modernize user terminals and teleports, leaning into software-defined architectures to make use of military, commercial and allied satcom networks. “In satcom, I think we need to have that 3GPP moment,” said Mike Dean, director of Command, Control and Communications (C3) Infrastructure at DoD CIO, referring to the comprehensive global standards that made it possible for mobile devices to roam seamlessly across cellular networks. “I think we need to do the same thing with satcom terminals,” Dean said Tuesday at MILSATCOM USA. “They’ve got to be light, they’ve got to be inexpensive, they’ve got to be software-defined, so we can put the different waveforms and service-provided networks in them.” Dean’s office is responsible for the digital transformation of legacy C3 capabilities, which includes modernizing ground infrastructure and supporting satcom user terminal upgrades across the military branches. While the space segment has undergone significant modernization, there has been a tendency to underestimate the importance of the ground segment, exemplified by the lag in user equipment for the narrowband Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). Dean described user terminals as “the tail that wags the dog,” noting it can currently take 7 to 15 years to integrate new terminals into ships, submarines or aircraft “until we get to software defined.” Paul Van Slett, the SATCOM division chief at DoD CIO, reiterated the point, saying a satellite designed for satcom “that is not interoperable with the ground segment or user terminal “is effectively an orbiting paperweight.” Speaking at MILSATCOM USA, Van Slett elaborated the need for interoperability, calling for a shift away from hardware toward software, or virtualization, which is common in the mobile industry and beginning to be used in commercial satcom. Virtualization employs software-based representations of physical computing resources, like routers, switches, modems, networks, servers and even waveforms. “Part of the modernization effort will be to reduce the amount of bespoke ‘pizza boxes’ that exist in DoD [satcom facilities] and field standardized servers that can be upgraded as necessary,” said Van Slett, referring to vendor-specific hardware. “Software upgrades are a lot faster than doing all the wiring and cabling and interoperability testing of new hardware when that new hardware wasn’t necessary to begin with, when that capability can be virtualized.” The DoD CIO has joined several industry consortia working to standardize and virtualize core elements of the ground segment. These include the Digital Intermediate Frequency Interoperability (DIFI) Consortium and the Waveform Architecture for Virtualized Ecosystems (WAVE) Consortium. WAVE is currently working to develop a standard for waveform virtualization so satellite modems can be software-based, replacing bespoke hardware and improving resiliency by diversifying data pathways. “This allows the ability for waveforms, if necessary, to be routed to alternate facilities to keep missions up, to allow that capability to be extended across long distances, or to provide resiliency,” Van Slett explained. Virtualization would also allow the military to upgrade waveforms as new ones are developed without buying new equipment, he continued. “Now that can be done through a simple software upgrade on standardized servers, just like routing and switching virtualization.” The potential advantages of satcom virtualization have reached policymaking circles. Earlier this week, the DoD CIO issued a response to Congress after being asked what is being done to virtualize waveforms, Van Slett told sister publication Via Satellite. The DoD CIO will continue outlining parameters for the future ground segment. Before the end of the year, they are expected to release the Modernized Teleport System (MTS) capability development document. The document will define needed improvements in developing a resilient, multi-band, multi-orbit, multi-path satcom enterprise. This story was first published by Via Satellite
B-52H Upgrades Face Supply Challenges
BARKSDALE AFB, La.–Announced by Boeing [BA] in 2009 and first fielded in 2014, the company’s Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) upgrade for the B-52H has been to replace old displays and communications on the early 1960s bomber with such features as a moving map display in the cockpit and new displays at all crew stations, Link 16, and machine-to-machine beyond-line-of-sight tasking/re-targeting. Yet, the effort is incomplete. B-52Hs with the 20th Bomb Squadron here, for example, are to be the first to receive Link 16 in a fleet wide effort over the next several years. On a Tuesday B-52H training flight, the two cockpit CONECT screens were working, but those at the other crew stations were not. “Some of those [CONECT screens] have, over time, failed,” said Lt. Col. James Bresnahan, the commander of the 11th Bomb Squadron here. “We could pull those off of other aircraft, but now that aircraft has one or zero.” CONECT allows bomber crews to plug in radios and mission equipment to display it in a moving map format that integrates off-board sensor and mission data. In the last decade, B-52Hs have gotten the Joint Range Extension Applications Protocol (JREAP) to allow satellite data transfer over long distances and the Intelligence Broadcast Receiver (IBR) to permit the bomber crews to get radio-accepted global intelligence updates. “Without that [JREAP and IBR], the B-52 had some roll-on systems we would carry on and plug in to get satellite updates but didn’t have a built-in design with the aircraft system to receive those updates,” Bresnahan said. “We went through a couple of iterations of that, of we gotta carry a suitcase on with a laptop, put a pseudo-antenna out the top of the airplane to get updates, and that was never integrated into [the bomber], fully supported, sustained, and developed whereas the JREAP, IBR and their CONECT framework has been fully supported and developed over time with limitations.” Boeing has been the sole-source integrator for a wide array of B-52H modernization efforts, including internal weapons bay and communications network/electronics upgrades and a new active electronically scanned array radar based on RTX‘s [RTX] APG-79. The Air Force has said that the weapons bay upgrades would provide a 67 percent increase in smart weapons capacity. The linchpin B-52H modernization thrust has been the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) to replace the plane’s eight Pratt & Whitney [RTX] TF33-PW-103 engines, with more powerful Rolls-Royce F130s. “Because of the long acquisition and fielding process, we’re lagging behind in the design stage all the way up to implementation,” Bresnahan said. “That’s definitely one of the challenges in fielding any of our new modernization [programs], CONECT being an example. When we’re looking at other big programs, those are being designed, planned and programmed now, but it’s gonna be five to 10 years before we implement so, just by nature of how that process works, we’ll be lagging a little bit behind and not have 2025 software and systems completely lining up with what is fielding today.” Begun by the Air Force in 2013, B-52H Bomber Software Blocks (BSBs) are an effort to stay ahead of the curve and align software/hardware for such major programs as RMP and CERP. The current effort is BSB 7.2, and BSB 8 is to begin in the next two years. The B-52H crew is to reduce from five to four, as the specialized electronic warfare officer (EWO)’s duties transfer to the other crew, including the weapons system officers below the cockpit. “About 75 percent” of the EWO’s systems are “obsolete so we have started decommissioning a lot of the old systems,” Bresnahan said. “Only a few of the more modern systems remain that are directly connected to the defensive mission. There are some Air Force efforts to update and modernize those pieces of equipment, but those systems alone are not what we need for the complete defensive mindset and picture. At the [EWO] station and the other crew stations, we have CONECT interfaces so [the EWO] can take advantage of the other data fusion information we can receive to build the defensive picture.” Another issue for B-52H crews has been the functioning of the mission data tape readers. “We have two readers of the tape mission data,” Bresnahan said. “On most of the aircraft just one is functioning…One of them can get the job done, but, if both of those systems fail on the ground, we’ve gotta call out maintenance and get a replacement, and they may have to pull it off of another aircraft and put it onto ours to make it flyable. In flight, we can have a mission loaded with some capability, but certain failures may prohibit us from loading our mission data into weapons and fully getting the mission done.”
Commentary: DoD Zeroes in on Boosting Cybersecurity for Systems that Sustain the Military
By Steve Orrin, Defense Opinion Writer The Department of Defense (DoD) is sharpening its cybersecurity focus on operational technology (OT), the systems that sustain military operations. With hostile actors increasingly targeting these systems, the department is expected to release OT-specific zero trust guidance this summer. Zero trust for information technology is familiar territory, but applying these principles to OT is fundamentally different—and far more complex. While protecting these systems has become a top defense priority, finding ways to use these principles across both technologies remains a challenge. A critical and vulnerable domainSince the 2022 rollout of its zero trust strategy, the DoD’s cybersecurity focus has centered on IT networks and data systems. OT systems remained in the background despite their essential role in sustaining operations. In general, these systems include HVAC and fire suppression units that ensure environmental safety; access control and surveillance systems safeguarding facilities; shipyard systems critical to Navy readiness; and medical devices integral to Defense Health Agency missions. For the DoD, OT systems also include mission platforms, weapons systems, sensors and radars. OT also encompasses technologies such as industrial sensors, alarm networks and factory machinery—all increasingly in the crosshairs as attackers escalate their efforts. “For OT and weapon systems, we are coming out with initial zero trust guidance. Why? Because the adversary is attacking,” said Randy Resnick, the DoD’s zero trust portfolio management office senior advisor. “The adversary wants to get into weapon systems to prevent their launch or mess with the GPS coordinates, so the DoD is looking to initially secure these things beyond what they are today,” Although the imminent guidance will focus on general OT, these guidelines likely will also address weapons systems and defense-critical infrastructure in follow-ons. The stakes are high because OT is where cyber vulnerabilities translate into real-world consequences, such as disrupting physical operations, halting logistics and impairing critical manufacturing. Why OT security isn’t plug-and-playThe core mission of OT systems—ensuring continuous, safe operations—sometimes runs counter to the agility demanded by modern cybersecurity practices. Often decades old and designed for nonstop operation, many OT systems are hard to patch or upgrade, with custom hardware and unsupported legacy software complicating security. Although many OT systems now include networked components, servers and web interfaces, applying conventional IT security tools can jeopardize stability. Installing endpoint security may be routine on a workstation, but it can trigger failures on more complicated systems such as a programmable logic controller or other advanced components for managing factory operations. DoD officials have indicated that the forthcoming OT zero trust guidance will outline 35 to 40 specific activities—roughly half the scope of its IT counterpart. While the final framework remains to be seen, this is a promising indication that the department recognizes OT security requires a tailored approach, not a one-size-fits-all solution. Collaboration to drive practical outcomesSecuring OT under a zero trust framework isn’t just a technical challenge; it’s an organizational one. Success depends on aligning IT and OT stakeholders early. IT-driven policies often overlook OT’s operational realities, while OT teams may resist security measures they view as disruptive. Collaboration ensures strategies are practical, effective, and mission ready. With alignment in place, agencies should start by implementing segmentation. Creating strict boundaries between systems, such as separating HVAC from surveillance and isolating fire suppression from medical devices, limits lateral movement and contains breaches. Most agencies already have the infrastructure, switches, routers and firewalls to implement segmentation and reduce risk quickly. Next, agencies must enforce precise access and identity controls. Zero trust isn’t just about defining who can access a system, but also tightly controlling what users are allowed to do. In OT environments, this means highly granular, role-based permissions. For example, HVAC technicians should have no access pathways to surveillance or alarm systems. OT’s fixed-function nature makes it easier to lock down expected behaviors and block everything else, but this demands close coordination between security teams and operational staff to align controls with real workflows. Tool selection and visibility come next. Many IT vendors now offer OT-branded security solutions, but these tools must be purpose-built for OT’s unique constraints. Applying standard IT controls, even from trusted vendors, without verifying OT compatibility risks disruption instead of protection. For systems that can’t support direct security agents, teams can embed network-based sensors to continuously monitor for anomalies without interfering with sensitive systems. This external visibility strengthens detection and response while protecting even outdated or fragile devices. Together, these measures create a resilient foundation for OT security. Agencies that act now will strengthen their posture, meet compliance requirements and safeguard mission-critical operations in an increasingly contested landscape. Securing for the long termThe DoD’s forthcoming OT guidance marks a pivotal shift in zero trust, expanding its reach from IT to the physical systems that sustain defense operations. But success depends on more than new policies; it requires disciplined execution and collaboration across various operational teams. As adversaries increasingly target the operational backbone of defense, OT security has become the new frontline of cybersecurity. The forthcoming guidance will offer a roadmap, but true resilience demands action now. Defense agencies that move decisively, segregating systems, tightening access controls, selecting purpose-built tools and fostering strong collaboration, will build lasting operational strength. They’ll be prepared for the next attack—and every one that follows. Steve Orrin is Intel’s federal chief technology officer and senior principal engineer.
In observance of the Juneteenth holiday, Defense Daily will not be published June 19. Your next issue will be dated June 23.
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