A new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) argued the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program faces challenges as it plans to overlap the design and production phases with an overly optimistic schedule.

This report published on June 26, “Next Generation Interceptor Program Should Take Steps to Reduce Risk and Improve Efficiency,” said that while MDA’s NGI program is on track to start product development this year, the overlap in design and production activities could be disrupted by any major design issues that come up.

Figure 1 from the June 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Missile Defense Agency’s Next Generation Interceptor program. (Image: GAO)
Figure 1 from the June 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the Missile Defense Agency’s Next Generation Interceptor program. (Image: GAO)

“Further, the schedule for NGI is already optimistic when compared to development timeframes of similar weapon systems and MDA’s history of unmet testing goals,” the report said.

The report specifically cited one example where the current NGI schedule calls for flight testing starting within about six years after MDA awarded the current development contracts, but a 2019 Federally Funded Research and Development Center study found weapons systems similar to NGI using kill vehicles, satellites and strategic systems typically take about seven years from contract award to first flight test or are ready to launch.

In 2019 MDA also previously estimated it would take 8.5 years to get from NGI contract award to the first flight test.

GAO said MDA officials told them that when DoD established the NGI acquisition strategy in 2020 they planned to incentivize contractors to improve upon that initial 8.5-year estimate to reach the flight testing, leading to the latest schedule acceleration timeline of six years.

However, the report argued MDA has not demonstrated it can conduct Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system flight testing at the pace needed to support a 2028 deadline to field NGI and the GMD system has never been able to conduct more than two intercept flight tests within two years, with an average of one intercept flight test every 1.73 years.

“In our prior reporting on missile defense, we have found that MDA has struggled to achieve its annual testing goals. NGI production and fielding is contingent on the program successfully executing three intercept flight tests within a span of 2 years. However, the GMD program has never successfully executed more than two intercept flight tests within a span of 2 years since the program started testing operationally configured GMD interceptors in 2006,” GAO said.

In April MDA selected Lockheed Martin [LMT] to continue developing NGI over competitor Northrop Grumman [NOC] (Defense Daily, April 15)

GAO also noted MDA plans to continue purchasing long lead materials for the initial interceptors meant to be used in upcoming flight tests, but the NGI designs are not mature and “any changes could necessitate rework on interceptors currently in early production.”

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) in 2023 authorized MDA to order additional long lead test materials for eight test articles, per contractor, after conducting preliminary design reviews. 

The report said while procuring long lead items would provide contractors time to build up initial units to support the flight testing, this could disrupt the program since the NGI design is not expected to be finalized until the critical design review is completed.

“Any significant discoveries made during development may, in turn, disrupt the program,” GAO said.

Concept image of Lockheed Martin version of Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) in flight. (Artist rendering: Lockheed Martin)
Concept image of Lockheed Martin version of Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) in flight. (Artist rendering: Lockheed Martin)

The report also noted NGI prime contract development costs have already increased by hundreds of millions of dollars, although they are still within the program’s current budget. The increase was partially attributed to contractor actions to mitigate schedule risk and increasing material costs due to supply chain issues and lasting COVID-19 pandemic effects.

While MDA has thus far added cost to quicken and maintain the schedule via a contract that pays contractors for total allowable incurred cost, “program officials indicated that they do not believe trading cost for schedule is sustainable going forward.”

GAO also pointed out MDA disagreed with key aspects of risk assessment in a 2022 independent review conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Research and Engineering (R&E), the second for the program.

The three most significant risks in the review included completing all required survivability testing on component-level parts before conducting preliminary design reviews; challenges associated with NGI’s threat requirements, which was not explained in detail due to information sensitivity; and developing models and simulations needed to evaluate interceptor performance and mature certain critical technologies.

While MDA is addressing the first concern, it generally disagreed with most of the rest of the assessment.

However, GAO said that it found the OUSD (R&E) review “findings and recommendations regarding threat requirements and models and simulations were consistent with DoD policy, guidance, and capability requirements established for NGI. We also found that MDA was not taking steps to fully address these risks.”

The report conclude that MDA could reduce program risk further by better working with key stakeholders like the intelligence community and Joint Staff, to address high risk items from the OUSD (R&E) report with NGI’s threat requirements as well as use models and simulations that fully represents how the warfighter intends to use NGI to find performance shortfalls before production and testing start.

GAO made five recommendations for the NGI program, starting with  tasking the OUSD (A&S) with ensuring the MDA regularly coordinates with the intelligence community, Joint Staff and combatant commands throughout program development to prioritize and update NGI threat requirements and also ensure MDA promptly reports changes in the threat that may have implications for NGI threat requirements to appropriate DoD leaders.

It also recommended OUSD (A&S) be tasked with ensuring the MDA uses models and simulations that fully represent stressing intercept conditions for NGI performance and technology maturation assessments supporting the program’s critical design review and key acquisition decisions; MDA should develop a plan for budgeting for and expediting development of all models and simulations needed to support the NGI critical design review and ground testing; and MDA should conduct periodic independent organizational assessments of its efforts for implementing a digital engineering environment for the GMD program to support NGI development and incorporate lessons learned into implementation plans.

DoD only agreed with the last recommendation, arguing MDA already regularly coordinated with stakeholders and promptly reports NGI threat changes implicated in requirements as well as increasing model and simulation fidelity over the acquisition lifecycle.