A new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress found that several technologies for the Columbia-class submarine program need more development and testing to prevent cost and schedule delays that could delay deployment of the lead submarine beyond a 2031 deadline.
Twelve Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are planned to replace the existing 14 Ohio-class vessels that provide the sea leg in the U.S. nuclear weapons triad. The Ohio-class submarines are scheduled to begin retiring in 2027 and the first Columbia-class unit must start patrols in 2031 to avert a gap in nuclear weapons capabilities.
The Columbia-class program is expected to cost up to $267 billion over its life-cycle, which includes $128 billion to research, develop, and purchase the units.
Last month, Rear Adm. Michael Jabaley, Program Executive Officer for Submarines, said that after the Columbia program reached Milestone B in late 2016, the office was able to reduce the cost per submarine by $80 million to $7.1 billion (Defense Daily, Nov. 8).
Despite the importance and time pressures, the GAO found that additional development and testing is needed to demonstrate the maturity of technologies critical to performance while the program moves into the design phase. This includes the integrated power system (IPS), nuclear reactor, common missile compartment and propulsor/coordinated stern, and stern area system (SAS)
The GAO said the Navy made progress in some areas, like prototyping efforts for the missile compartment and nuclear reactor, but that all of the named systems still need further development to mature them to the point at which GAO’s technology readiness guide considers a technology mature, which is Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7.
TRL 7 is when a system prototype is near or at the planned operational system demonstrated in an operational environment.
The office explained that the nuclear reactor, IPS, propulsor and coordinated stern, and SAS “all have potentially significant effects on design and construction” of the submarine because they involve much of the design and physical structure of the vessel.
The office said based on assessing the Navy’s documentation, the IPS, propulsor, and SAS are not yet at the TRL 7 level “and thus pose risk given their current level of demonstrated maturity and importance for meeting program cost, schedule, and performance requirements.”
“As a result, it is unknown at this point whether they will work as expected, be delayed, or cost more than planned. Any unexpected delays could postpone the deployment of the lead submarine past the 2031 deadline,” the GAO said.
The GAO criticized the Navy by noting the service underrepresented the program’s technology risks in its 2015 Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA), which only identified two submarine technologies as “critical.”
The office said the Navy did not follow the GAO’s identified best practices in identifying critical technology elements (CTEs), which then underrepresents the technical risk facing the program. The two CTEs named were the SAS and a carbon dioxide removal system. CTEs are required to be at Milestone B, which is at the end of the technology maturation and risk reduction phase of a major acquisition program and prior to the start of engineering and manufacturing development.
This underrepresenting of the technology risk “can hinder Congress’ and other decision makers’ full understanding of the program’s progress.”
The office said this is particularly important because the Navy has already requested $1.6 billion for advanced procurement and this fall awarded General Dynamics [GD] a $5.1 billion detail design contract (Defense Daily, Sept. 21).
GAO noted the team responsible for preparing the 2015 TRA did not identify all appropriate CTEs because it used a more restrictive definition of what a CTE is than recommended in the GAO best practices guide and the Defense Department’s 2011 TRA guide.
The GAO also highlighted there is actually no requirement for the Navy to report to Congress on progress in developing and testing these technologies until after the Columbia program finishes its production readiness review in May 2020. This will be after the Navy has already requested a further $8.7 billion to fund construction of the lead submarine.
If the typical budgeting schedule occurs, this request will go before congress in Feb. 2020 and the Navy plans to begin construction of the first submarine in fiscal year 2020.
“Congress will be asked to approve lead ship construction absent key information on the maturity of the critical technologies that, at present, are not up to the maturity levels that would provide assurance they will work as intended,” the report said.
Without further updates on technology progress “we believe Congress will not have information it needs to evaluate technical risk in advance of the Navy’s requests for considerable increases in program funding,” GAO said.
The GAO noted in 2009 it recommended that before a contract was awarded for detail design, new ship critical technologies should be matured into actual prototypes and successfully demonstrated in an operational environment, part of the TRL 7 phase.
The Defense Department concurred but said modeling and simulation should be considered appropriate in some cases in lieu of actual prototype testing.
“If any of these systems do not develop as planned, the Navy and the shipyards could be required to complete some redesign, or, if risks manifest later, they may force costly workarounds or construction rework,” GAO said.