Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher (D-Calif.), who chairs the House Armed Services Committee strategic forces subcommittee, whom President Obama has chosen for a nonproliferation post in the State Department, made comments today at a Missile Defense Agency symposium presented by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Reagan Building in Washington, D.C., and in remarks to defense journalists afterwards. Speech:
… The world is a very dangerous place. There are a lot of non-state actors and rogue nations are working to develop missile technology to do harm to America, American interests, and our forward-deployed troops. That is why we need missile defense systems that work. That means the systems have to be very rigorously tested and operationally effective. In short, they have to work. We can take three steps to achieve that goal: First, our testing requirements need to be rigorous, intellectually honest and thorough, especially with regard to the long-range Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Second, the Missile Defense Agency needs to be integrated into the normal defense planning, budgetary and weapons system development processes in the Pentagon.
And finally, we need to make those tough choices in a budgetary environment that is, to say the least, constrained. As you know, I have been a long-time supporter of missile defense, even though some people don’t want to admit it. I voted for the Missile Defense Act of 1999, which made it the policy of the United States to deploy an effective national missile defense system that would defend the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
There is one caveat: that the system (works), that the system reaches what we call in Congress a system that was credibly deterrent, a system that convinced both our allies and our adversaries that we weren’t kidding.
That’s why I (didn’t) agree with everything the Bush administration did with regard to missile defense, especially the decision to deploy the GMD system in Alaska before we had confidence that it would work.
Our critics sometimes want to get something in the ground as soon as possible to meet (a) deadline, rather than something that is competent and credible. Testing was something that was put on the back burner. We know that the Ground-based missile defense system has not been sufficiently tested. In fact, there was no intercept testing in fiscal 2008. These delays led the Pentagon testing and operations — evaluation office to raise questions as to whether we were any safer. Additionally, the rush to deploy the system has forced the department to go back and fix problems that could have been avoided had we taken a more rigorous and systematic approach to engineering, developing, testing … the system. It’s just like buying a car, especially a used car, without taking it to the mechanic first. Why buy other people’s problems when you can have a mechanic let you know what you are getting into beforehand.
Finally, missile defenses do not have the luxury of expecting to operate in a predictable world with (garble) That is why all missile defenses must be integrated into a multi- mission environment included in our total force structure. Consistent and improved engineering, testing and appropriate refurbishment must be a foundation of our progress (in) missile defense systems.
So how do we improve testing? The good news is that Gen. O’Reilly’s approach is the right step in the right direction at the right time. And I applaud his energetic … approach. Gen. O’Reilly has developed a remarkable insight that could lead to remarkable (results. The insight is this — ) you can’t figure out what you need until you know what you have. Now, in any other endeavor, crunching numbers would be the obvious way to learn where you stand. … CEOs do it. Why wouldn’t we do it? That’s why I look forward to seeing the results of a review that will be completed later this year. I hope that it will provide a solid blueprint for an adequate testing program that will increase our confidence in the defensive capability of the GMD system.
The second major issue is that we need to integrate the Missile Defense Agency into the normal DOD acquisition, budgetary and requirements (processes). Doing so would expedite deployment of missile defense capabilities to protect us against a North Korean missile attack. The Missile Defense Agency is fundamentally a research and development organization. It evolved from a science and research foundation that rewards the successful demonstration and validation of technology under test conditions, as opposed to developing and fielding full-scale weapon systems. The Missile Defense Agency cannot and should not be expected to fully comprehend what it’s going to respond to — operational suitability and survivability requirements. It is just not part of the agency’s (garble). The reason Aegis BMD and THAAD have done as well as they have is because they originally belonged to the Navy and the Army. The services (aim) to buy the details of their program to make certain that they adequately met all the normal requirements to develop and field their respective systems. THAAD and Aegis BMD maintained standards that guided the development of the weapons systems, and for the most part (they met them). There was no ad hoc approach. They had a consistent process … they stuck to it, and they produced great (results). The results of this approach are evident. In 2008, the commander of the Navy test and evaluation board declared that the current version of Aegis BMD to be operationally effective … On the other hand, the one system that MDA has deployed and has had the largest role in designing, developing, testing has been the GMD system. And that’s where we have the biggest doubt. What is clear is that in order to have missile defense systems that work, the military services must define the operational requirements early. They also have to stay involved throughout the program to ensure that key warfighter requirements are built into the system from the beginning.
Now, there are also … issues with the European site. First, let’s assume that their only objective is to provide the United States a shoot-look-shoot capability against a potential Iranian long-range missile attack. Let’s also assume that other that other threats, such as geopolitical considerations, don’t matter. … Then, and only then, would the European GMD proposal be attractive. But Iran has not developed a long-range missile capable of reaching the United States yet. If Iran were to do so in the future, the GMD (system) currently at Fort Greeley in Alaska should have the capability to protect the United States. … The argument that the U.S. would be naked against an Iranian threat unless we deployed the GMD site in Europe is simply not right. But more importantly, while Iran is a ways away from developing ICBM-class missiles, it already has the largest force of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East. These systems are currently capable of targeting U.S. forces and our allies throughout the region.
And guess what? The proposed BMD interceptors in Poland would have little if any capability to counter this existing threat from Iran’s short- and medium0-range ballistic missiles.
But what puzzles me about the state of the European site is that the proponents of the site have been running around with their hair on fire, warning that the potential threat … the Iranian threat …
My position has always been that before we move to expand the GMD system, we need a little common sense. That is to say, a first-things-first approach. We need to take a number of specific steps.
First, along with our allies, we need to develop and deploy sufficient theater missile defense capabilities to counter the existing short- and medium-range threat from Iran in the theater.
I’ve never understood why the previous administration did not make this the first step in their plans for European Missile Defense. The existing threat seems to be an afterthought.
Second, we need to have a greater degree of confidence that the GMD system will work before we (take a position) to expand it. This is why Congress included provisions in the defense authorization bill last year that would prohibit the Pentagon from acquiring or deploying operational GMD interceptors in Europe until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that they work. I expect that Congress will maintain this prohibition.
Third, the Obama administration is doing the right thing by undertaking reviews of the proposed European site. Given the key political, strategic and technical issues associated with the proposed deployment, (the review) was fully justified and necessary.
The administration has also signaled a desire to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. Russia and the United States face a potential threat from Iranian ballistic missiles, and we should look for areas where we can work together. But Russia does not and should not have a veto over the security of the United States and its allies. (She made that point in a trip to Russia recently.) I also delivered a clear message to our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic. Even as we move to do the testing we should have done already, and after the administration reviews European Missile Defense, we will continue to work with them to strengthen the U.S.-NATO … partnership.
Finally, we are entering a most challenging budgetary environment we have faced in a generation. We will likely be forced to make tradeoffs throughout the budget … The overall funding for missile defense may be reduced. In my view, one of the fundamental problems with the missile defense program over the last 20 years has been that Congress and the Pentagon have been unwilling to make hard choices. We have tried to continue every program, regardless of the cost increases or schedule delays.
The Airborne Laser, which is eight years behind schedule and $4 billion over budget, is an excellent example. It reminds me of the definition of insanity. You keep doing the wrong thing over and over again, and don’t learn from it. Let me be clear: those days are over. We can no longer continue to do everything and explore every potential technology. Missile defense cannot be … the triumph of hope over experience. But our highest priority in the missile defense budget should be providing our combatant commanders adequate and sufficient theater missile defense capabilities to meet their warfighting requirements. The threat from short- and medium-range missiles represents the main threat to our national security, and to our allies. That’s what we should be focusing on.
In addition, we also need to focus our limited resources on mature systems to address near-term threats. Right now, only 22 Aegis warships are planned to be upgraded to … ballistic missile defense operations. We must seriously consider adding additional Aegis cruisers and destroyers to be able to conduct ballistic missile defense operations. Finally, future adjustments in GMD should focus on addressing a couple of key issues. Most importantly, now that the system has been deployed, we must make certain that existing GMD systems can conduct real-time combat operations. Developing a missile defense system that works is a tall order, because we are bound to geopolitical concerns, budgetary concerns and technological concerns. But we can get it right, if we have a rigorous, systematic approach put in place. And that is why I applaud Gen. O’Reilly’s endeavor. (Since the late 1990s, that program) suffered a number of setbacks. The Army brought in a new program manager, Col. Patrick O’Reilly, to get the program back on track. Then-Col. O’Reilly applied a systematic and disciplined approach to the THAAD program that many agree is the reason why that program is healthy today. I am hopeful that Gen. O’Reilly will bring that same approach to the entire missile defense program. (If he is successful,) I am confident that sometime in the near future, the Pentagon’s testing and evaluation office will declare that all of our systems will work in a real-world environment.
Let me thank you all very much for your hard work. I know that this is a tough environment. I know that there is anxiety about what the funding stream will be in the … budget. But let me tell you this: I will fight hard, and my colleagues will continue to fight hard, to make sure that all the money that we can afford, all the money that is appropriate, will be (injected) into these systems, and that we will continue to lead in this area.
And I thank you very much for your patriotism and your hard work, and I hope you have a great day. (applause)
Afterward, with journalists
[Q. Space & Missile Defense Report — Is the Ground-based Missile Defense system salvage-able, or have we gone so far down the road with its development and your feeling is, it’s still not a reliable system that we should jettison it?]
Tauscher – No, we’re nowhere near that conclusion, and I would think that is the last conclusion we want to go to. What Gen. O’Reilly has done is launch this review (of missile defense systems), and clearly the effort is to take a system which has great science and great opportunity and make sure that we go through this testing regimen (that we should have) had from the very beginning, so that we can reach not only credible deterrence but operational effectiveness, sustainability and survivability. Those are our keys, and that’s what we all want, and we’re cheering for it. We want it to do it. We want it to go all the way, but right now, we haven’t had a sufficient testing regimen. And that’s why we’re very pleased with what Gen. O’Reilly is doing.
There’s nobody that I know of that doesn’t want this to be successful. We all want it to succeed. But we have to go back to basics and make sure that it does.”
[Q. Space & Missile Defense Report — So more money there, instead of for procurement or something like that?]
Tauscher — Exactly.
[Q. Defense Daily — Your pledge to fight: is that while you’re still in Congress, or does that mean possibly when you’re in the (Obama) administration? Were you speaking there as a congresswoman?]
Tauscher — I’m … a person. But, thank you. I’m talking about Congress.
[Q. Bloomberg — You mentioned possible tradeoffs in the budget. What sort of tradeoffs?]
Tauscher — Well, I mean, I think what we made clear was that this is no longer the buffet where you can go from soup to nuts, and not worry about what the check is. For too long, the Bush administration, with the rubber-stamp Republican Congress, spent all the money it could on missile defense. We are very critical of the fact that while they were doing that, they just looked forward and didn’t look back, and they also didn’t test sufficiently. So we’ve got a lot [of hardware] to show for the money, but we don’t have a lot of credibility, operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability to show for the money, specifically for the GMD system. We’ve got fabulous systems: PAC-3, Aegis BMD, and THAAD. I mean, they are fabulous systems. But this long-range (GMD) system has got to be made right. Gen. O’Reily has a plan. We are pleased, very pleased, with his energy and his approach, and when we hear more about the details, I think we’ll have confidence that we can go forward.
[Q. — Before you spoke, Gen. Cartwright was there, and he said that ballistic missiles have become as pass� as email. And he said no one would be stupid enough to fire one at us. And so he was talking about the emphasis on the sensors and the networks and … some of your comments on medium- and short-range missiles (seem the same)?]
Tauscher — That’s right. We’re still mystified as to why that wasn’t a priority. Our current existing threat, which is significant, is from Iranian short- and medium-range missiles targeted at Southern Europe, our allies, our forward-deployed troops and our assets. And that should have been the fundamental beginning of any system that was deployed in Europe. And what we also want is a NATO-ized system. We have an Article 5 commitment that says that those assets and those territories need to be protected because we’re going to get the 911 call. So we have pushed for two years to have a NATO-ized system that begins with the short-medium-range systems, which are already deployable. And then you can subsequently bolt on the long-range system. And that will be great. But that would allow for testing, sufficient testing, of the long-range system, too.
[Q. — (Would you somehow delay the Polish interceptors, but you will go ahead the Czech radar)?]
Tauscher — Uh, that is not a decision that we have really looked at right now. What we’re — We’re still talking to our allies. We have a very strong commitment to our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic. We have, obviously, a very strong Article 5 commitment to protection of our NATO allies and our forward-deployed troops and their assets. As I said, we want a NATO-ized system. Certainly, the Czech radar would be part of a NATO-ized system, regardless of what we decided to do with the long-range system. But, um, that’s getting ahead of ourselves. We have to have this review. We have to make decisions about the long-range system’s testing, in order to achieve credible deterrence, operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability. But, you know, what we need to do is get a political consensus of that threat, and a political consensus about deployment of short- and medium-range missiles.
[Q. Space & Missile Defense Report — So do GMD, fix that to what you think is satisfactory, before you do European, before you do anything there?]
Tauscher — That’s right. Thank you. Thank you.