NASA’s inspector general is concerned about future enforcement of liability and insurance provisions for the agency’s commercial cargo and crew programs following how NASA, Virginia lawmakers and a state agency handled developments after the October Antares failure at Wallops Island.
NASA IG said in its Sept. 17 report (IG-15-023) the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), which manages the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) at NASA’s Wallops Island Flight Facility, Va., asked NASA to pay for repairs to the VCSFA launch facility damaged in the Antares failure. Two weeks after the launch failure, four Virginia lawmakers wrote the head of a House appropriations panel, requesting $20 million for repair work at Wallops Island.
The following month, NASA IG said, Congress passed a consolidated appropriations act that contained an explanatory statement directing NASA to reallocate $20 million from its budget request toward its 21st Century Space Launch Complex Program, a line item that encompasses Wallops Island. Despite this, disagreements remained over who should pay for the launch pad repairs.
A key NASA official exchanged correspondence with the VCSFA executive director, informing him of the Space Act Agreement insurance requirements. The VCSFA executive director, in response, told NASA it didn’t inform the authority of its need to insure the launch pads. To satisfy Congress and avoid delays, NASA on March 13 issued a notice of intent to non-competitively increase the value of its existing contract with VCSFA by $5 million. NASA officials told NASA IG that the funding will come from other programs within the space operations budget, which includes the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Communications and Navigation program.
In light of the Wallops Island experience, NASA IG remains concerned regarding future enforcement of liability and insurance provisions for commercial cargo and crew programs. NASA IG believes the requirements were clear: NASA was not financially responsible for damage to agency property or VCSFA property. Nevertheless, after the Antares failure, the Virginia congressional delegation took steps to make $20 million of NASA’s budget available to help fund Wallops Island repairs, funds that the inspector general believes could be put to better use.
“As NASA continues to rely on commercial companies to provide cargo, and soon crew, transportation services to ISS, it is important to ensure that all parties comply with procedures regarding obtaining (or waiving) insurance and clarifying who pays for what in the event of a mishap,” NASA IG said.
In its report, NASA IG also criticized Orbital ATK’s [OA] return to flight plan following its Antares failure, claiming it contains technical and operational risks and may be difficult to execute as designed and on the timetable proposed. NASA IG said although the Atlas V has a strong flight record and is a suitable rocket for Orbital ATK missions, the company will be integrating its Cygnus capsule with United Launch Alliance’s (ULA) Atlas V rocket for the first time. ULA is a joint venture of Lockheed Martin [LMT] and Boeing [BA].
NASA IG also said Orbital ATK must accelerate development of its modified Antares launch system, refitting it with new engines for two planned launches in 2016. This tight schedule, the IG said, does not include a flight test for the modified system and provides limited opportunities for qualification and certification testing.
NASA IG said although NASA increased monitoring of Orbital ATK’s milestone plan and RD-181 engine testing for the modified Antares, it has not conducted detailed technical assessments of the modified system and the associated qualification testing results. Finally, NASA IG believes Orbital ATK’s plan to drop one of its scheduled Cargo Resupply Services (CRS) missions may disadvantage NASA by decreasing the agency’s flexibility in choosing the type and size of cargo the company transports to the ISS.
NASA IG said in past audits of spaceflight programs it has found project managers are often overly optimistic about the effort required to modify heritage technologies, in this case, incorporating the RD-181 engines into Antares, and underestimate the time needed to address known and unknown risks by assuming that most risks will not materialize. Before using the RD-181, Orbital ATK must modify the Antares first stage structure, steering mechanisms, fuel tanks and lines and flight control software to accommodate the new engine.
The extent of these modifications, coupled with the company’s aggressive launch schedule, will limit the time available to conduct qualification testing of the new engines and other components. Notably, with the first two RD-181 engines having been delivered to the United States in July, Orbital ATK plans two types of stage tests at NASA’s Wallops Island Flight Facility—cold-flow and hot-fire—but does not plan to conduct a full “test-like-you-fly” launch profile hot-fire test or a demonstration flight before the planned Orb-5 launch in March.
Further, NASA IG said Orbital ATK will have limited time to update and test launch control software for the new engine specifications if it plans to meet a March launch date.