Last month, Rep. William Timmons (R-S.C.), the chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s military and foreign affairs panel, asked DoD, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Transportation to submit by July 10 a list of documents related to the agencies’ counter-drone efforts, including a list of drone flights around military installations since January 2022 and “relevant policies, memoranda, and interagency agreements guiding the detection, identification, tracking, and mitigation of unauthorized unmanned aerial systems over or near military installations and other federally protected sites.”
‘The Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs is continuing to investigate how the federal government addresses drone incursions on U.S. military installations and sensitive sites,” Timmons wrote in a June 26 letter to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Attorney General Pam Biondi, and Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy. “Recent high-profile incursions near sensitive military facilities, power infrastructure, and public events suggest that the current framework for domestic counter-drone operations remains fragmented and, in some cases, insufficiently agile to meet evolving threats.”
Other signers of the June 26 letter are Rep. Mike Turner (R-Ohio), a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee’s tactical air and land forces and strategic forces panels; Rep. John McGuire (R-Va.), a member of the HASC tactical air and land forces and cyber, information technologies, and innovation panels; Rep. Eli Crane (R-Ariz.), a member of the House Committee on Homeland Security; Rep. Michael Cloud (R-Texas); Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.); Rep. Byron Donalds (R-Fla.); and Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-Fla.).
In February, U.S. Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot, the head of U.S. Northern Command, told Congress of over 350 drone incursions last year at more than 100 domestic military installations, and, at an April hearing of Loomis’ subcommittee, U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Paul Spedero, vice director for operations on the Joint Staff, said that U.S. military bases have “very little to somewhat more comprehensive” technologies to detect and track drones (Defense Daily, April 29).
“In many cases—such as the 17-day drone surveillance at Langley Air Force Base in December 2023—they appear to reflect coordinated efforts to gather intelligence on sensitive military assets,”according to the June 26th congressional letter. “At this [April, 2025] hearing, witnesses stressed that the advent of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled drone technologies—capable of autonomous navigation and tracking—amplifies the danger exponentially. The hearing also brought to light severe deficiencies in legal authorities and interagency coordination. Base commanders must rely on standing rules of engagement requiring a determination of ‘hostile intent’– a threshold difficult to meet in ambiguous or rapidly evolving situations. Detection and mitigation capabilities vary drastically between bases, and coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Aviation Administration, and state and local law enforcement is often improvised and bureaucratically delayed.”
The recent Israeli Rising Lion and Ukrainian Spider Web operations using small drones and Guillot’s cited number of drone flights around U.S. military bases last year have led to congressional concern on whether the U.S. is able to thwart attacks and intelligence gathering by small drones on home soil.
“Pay attention…the rest of the world is showing us,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Jason Armagost, the commander of Eighth Air Force and the Joint-Global Strike Operations Center at Barksdale AFB, La., wrote in a LinkedIn post last week. “We need engaged citizens to help us make a different future compared to the path we’re on. Congress is postured and evolving to act.”