Despite federally mandated security controls for the safeguarding of industrial sources of radioactive materials that if stolen could be used by terrorists to disperse radioactive material through a conventional explosive device, responsible federal agencies can do more to increase the security of these radiological sources, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Challenges remain for securing industrial sources of radiological materials even when industrial entities meet federal regulations, David Trimble, director for National Resources and Environment at GAO, told a Senate panel on Thursday.
In conducting its latest review of licensees using high-risk radiological sources, GAO auditors visited 33 industrial facilities in the United States that use either mobile or stationary or both types of sources. The review found that both types of sources “pose security challenges even when licensees follow NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) security controls,” Trimble told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Trimble said the NRC’s requirements provide a general security framework for licensees to implement but the direction lacks specifics such as “the robustness of locks that must be used or even that alarms be installed on trucks carrying mobile sources.” He added that GAO visited 15 companies that use radiography cameras—which have radioactive sources used in nondestructive inspection for a number of applications—all of whom met NRC security requirements, and “we found great variation in the security measures employed, with some companies using only the most basic of locks to secure these high-risk sources.”
Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), chairman of the Senate committee, cited a report two years ago by the GAO that found radiological material used in U.S. medical facilities as being vulnerable to theft and sabotage, and that the new report shows pretty much the same for industrial sources of the material.
“We must do better,” Carper said. “Given the consequences of a dirty bomb, there really is no excuse for the vulnerabilities identified by the GAO.”
Carper asked why dirty bomb attacks haven’t occurred and Trimble said that federal agencies “deserve credit” for their efforts to secure radiological sources. He added that GAO’s report is about what more can be done to secure these materials, saying “it only takes one to make a really bad day.”
GAO cites information from the International Atomic Energy Agency as saying there have been 615 confirmed incidents since 1993 of theft or loss or radiological and nuclear materials worldwide.
Trimble also said that federal agencies need to do a better job working together on radiological security.
In his prepared remarks, Trimble said the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked with the NRC and several Energy Department (DoE) national laboratories on a study of commercially available technologies for tracking mobile radiological sources yet hasn’t shared these results with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is part of the DoE with responsibility for providing security upgrades to U.S. facilities with high-risk radiological sources beyond NRC requirements. In another example, Trimble said the NNSA is developing a tracking system for devices that contain radioactive material but has not collaborated with DHS or the NRC on this.
The report says that as the NRC develops a best practices guide for radiological security measures, the agency needs to consult with stakeholders. It also says that the NRC needs to assess the process by which licensees allow their employees to have unescorted access to radiological materials to ensure against insider threats.