The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing its options and plans for a replacement strategy for its aging radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that could include refurbishment, according to government officials.
The department is looking at ways to improve the capability of RPMs and extend their service life rather than just do a one-for-one replacement, Huban Gowadia, acting director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within DHS, tells the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies.
Part of the detection technology mix going forward may be a combination of “more mobile and agile technologies in conjunction with existing technologies,” Gowadia says. David Maurer, director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office says that DHS has modified its radiation detection architecture approach to focus less on deploying static RPMs in favor of more flexible approaches and more deployable technologies.
Gowadia says that a an improvement program underway for the current generation polyvinyl toluene-based RPMs will end with developmental testing and field validation testing in FY 13. The improvements include ensuring that alternative neutron detection technologies are commercially available and that large quantities of Helium-3 will no longer be necessary for these systems, she says.
DNDO has already made sufficient progress on finding alternate neutron detection technologies due to the He-3 shortfall.
Recent testing of present and next-generation alternatives have demonstrated “sufficient performance to replace Helium-3 in RPMs,” Gowadia says. Moreover, government efforts to reduce the He-3 shortfall have led to a 40 percent increase in the strategic reserve of the gas the past three years, she adds.
Whether DHS decides to replace or refurbish its RPMs, the costs will likely be billions of dollars and take several years, Maurer tells the panel. He says that the RPM replacement strategy is expected to be completed in 2013.
The implementation plan shows that DHS plans to spend $1 billion over the next five years on radiological detection equipment for fixed sites, 10 percent of which is for international rail and air cargo, Rep. Dan Lungren (R-Calif.), chairman of the subcommittee, says.
Modified Deployment Plan
In his prepared remarks Maurer says that DHS has deployed 1,465 of the 1,537 RPMs that it plans to deploy, which is down from the previous expectations of more than 2,100 systems just two years ago. The deployment is expected to be finished by the end of 2014, he says.
Most of the RPMs that are deployed, 917, or about 63 percent, are at the nation’s land ports of entry and are screening 100 percent of all the containerized cargo, conveyances, and drivers and their passengers entering the U.S., Maurer says. He adds that more than 99 percent of non-commercial trucks and cars entering the country are also being screened by RPMs.
Most of the rest of the RPMs, 453, or 31 percent, are deployed at the nation’s seaports, Maurer says. Some smaller seaports that receive cargo may not have RPMs, he says. DHS will have an updated deployment plan in September that will address additional deployments to these smaller seaports, he says.
Screening of cargo entering the U.S. by rail remains challenging and most of it is done by handheld radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs) after an anomalous reading triggered by an X-Ray scan, Maurer says. DHS is wrapping up an International Rail Threat and Gap Study to determine the best approach for screening inbound rail cars for radiological and nuclear threats.
International air cargo and general aviation are two areas where DHS has made less progress in screening for radiological and nuclear materials, Maurer says. DHS officials interviewed by GAO say that the deployment of RPMs at most airports is “not feasible due to the lack of natural choke points where scanning would take place,” he says. Maurer adds that operational process changes also can’t overcome the challenges at airports to conduct more screening of air cargo and that screening will be conducted mainly with handheld detectors.
While DHS has focused on developing and deploying RPMs and other radiation detection technologies for the various types of ports of entry, there remain gaps between the ports.
In April DNDO provided Congress its implementation plan for the two-year old Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). Gowadia says that DHS needs cost-effective detectors that can be widely deployed and detection systems that can search wide areas, “even in the most challenging environments.” DNDO has programs under way for developing detection systems that can work at stand-off distances as well as networking multiple portable detectors, she says.
Maurer says that DHS still needs new technologies to detect shielded nuclear materials and for addressing the rail environment.
ASP Update
A year ago DHS terminated a key program that was meant provide some detection capabilities of shielded nuclear materials and begin to replace the PVT-based RPMs. However, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program suffered from development difficulties and couldn’t meet revised screening requirements in secondary inspection modes. The ASP program was formally canceled about two weeks ago.
The development program resulted in 13 ASPs being built for testing. DHS is transferring one of those systems to the State of New Mexico, which will use the system for screening cargo in a border security application, Gowadia says. The system meets the state’s requirements, which are less stringent than the original end user’s, which was Customs and Border Protection, and the deployment in New Mexico and other states will allow DNDO to continue to collect data, she says.
Maurer says that DHS has been learning from its past mistakes related to the planning, development, production and deployment of radiation detection equipment. He says problem programs like ASP are in the past and that the GNDA and its new implementation plan address previous GAO concerns that DHS define objectives, identify money and monitor progress.
However, DHS still has work to do here, Maurer says. The department needs to more clearly identify priorities within the implementation plan still needs to have a more “robust discussion” about its expected resource needs for radiation detection, he says.