Arab states like Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman need to contribute “far more robust and sustained naval patrolling” in the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean region and nations like the United States, France and the United Kingdom with “sufficient warships” need to patrol deeper into the area if they wish to stem the tide of piracy, illicit trafficking and maritime terrorism, according to a recent white paper.
The white paper, Countering Piracy, Trafficking and Terrorism: Ensuring Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean, by Rupert Herbert-Burns of the Stimson Center; also suggests these nations with sufficient warships could provide additional frigates and destroyers to extend the patrolling footprint deeper into the Strait of Hormuz and the Horn of Africa.
In addition, Herbert-Burns also argues more could be done to harness the surveillance and threat-reporting capability of all the merchant vessels in the region, which could potentially expand the intelligence-gathering capacity for military forces. But he also said an internationally-subsidized program to help the region’s local navies would pay off most.
“In the longer term, an internationally-supported financial program to boost the naval and coast guard capacity of countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles would better enable these states to provide far better maritime security in their own backyard,” Herbert-Burns wrote.
The white paper discusses how the northern Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region, which covers 2.5 million square miles, is unable to be secured by even a vastly-increased naval presence from well-armed, Somalia-based pirates. In response, merchant vessels are implementing their own anti-piracy measures, such as private, armed security; risk avoidance and anti-boarding and hardening measures.
“The hiring of armed private security guards is now becoming the norm rather than the exception,” Herbert-Burns said. “This serious risk-mitigating measure is being increasingly driven by the realization that naval forces cannot provide sufficient protection and because hull insurance underwriters and Protection & Indemnity Clubs are refusing to offer acceptable war risk premiums unless armed security teams are embarked.”
Herbert-Burns also argues that the sustained trafficking of drugs, weapons and people throughout the region will continue for the medium- to long-term because of numerous sources of high-volume supply for all three commodities, sufficiently large numbers of points of export in key countries that suffer from insecurity and corrupt officials, a largely insecure environment for all this to take place in and a massive array of sea transportation available to service all necessary sites of demand and consumption.
Even as the number of companies choosing to employ privately-contracted, armed security personnel to guard vessels, and their inclination to use lethal force, increases, Herbert-Burns wonders if there could be an increase in the level of firepower and aggressiveness by pirates.
“Such an escalation is likely to make the task of deterring and disrupting piracy in the Indian Ocean more problematic for naval commanders and policymakers,” Herbert-Burns wrote. “As the era of privately-contracted, armed security personnel increases evolves through 2012 and beyond, governments and decision-makers in the shipping industry will be monitoring whether the use of armed protection generates even-greater deterrence or fuels increased aggressiveness of hijackers willing to assume greater risks in order to capture ships.”