The United States should relax export control laws on commercial satellite systems and subsystems that have become less critical to national security over time, but should maintain strict controls on transfers of such items that could be used against its national interests, according to a joint State and Defense departments report released recently.

The “Section 1248” report, or Risk Assessment of United States Space Export Control Policy, assesses the national security risk of export control policy for satellite and related space items. The report finds four key findings:

·         Certain satellite technologies, such as direct broadcast television, satellite communications and earth mapping, have transitioned from military to predominantly civilian uses over the past 15 years. As a result, export control laws over these items should reflect their decreased sensitivity while still ensuring they cannot be used to significantly improve the military capabilities of another country.

·         Export of space-related items to U.S. allies and close partners present a low risk to national security and should be subject to few restrictions than exports and re-exports to other countries

·         The U.S. should maintain the status quo on the export and re-export of non-critical, space-related items that could be used against its national interests, as well as items whose end uses could be used against the United States.

·         U.S. Munitions List (USML) Special Export Controls remain necessary to mitigate against the substantial risks associated with services like: satellite failures and anomaly resolution, launch know-how, launch services and launch failure analysis.

The report recommends the continued need for certain space-related items to remain on the State Department-administered Munitions List because they, and related services, contain critical components and technologies, along with the expertise to create and use them, give the United States a critical military or intelligence advantage in space. These include: satellites that perform a purely military or intelligence mission, remote sensing satellites with high performance parameters, parts and components unique to military or intelligence mission satellites not common to dual-use (military and commercial) satellites and services in support of foreign launch operations for the USML and non-USML designated satellites.

The report finds items that would be more appropriately controlled (and less regulated) on the Commerce Department’s Commerce Control List (CCL) include: communications satellites (COMSAT) that don’t contain classified components, remote sensing satellites with performance parameters below certain thresholds and parts and components associated with these satellites and with performance parameters below thresholds specified for items remaining on the USML.

The report believes if its recommendations are implemented, it would result in: better government focus on the most sensitive items, improved secure trade with U.S. allies, synchronized State and Commerce departments licensing policies, improved long-term health and competitiveness of the U.S. satellite industrial base and bolster the supply security from second and third-tier suppliers.

“The steps recommended are fully consistent with the (Obama) administration’s broader export control reform efforts, which aim to build higher fences around fewer items,” Jim Miller, acting undersecretary of defense for policy, said in a statement.

Congress requested the report from the defense and state secretaries in Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, according to a DoD statement.

The report can be found at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/1248_Report_Space_Export_Control.pdf