The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) oversight of preventative and corrective maintenance performed on its more than 9,000 pieces of security screening systems is inadequate and creates risks of shortening the life of the equipment and incurring costs to replace these systems, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (IG) says in a new report.

“If the equipment is not fully operational, TSA may have to use other screening measures which could result in longer wait times and delays in passenger and baggage screening,” the IG says in the report, The Transportation Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program (OIG-15-86). “More importantly, our prior work on airport passenger and baggage screening demonstrated that these other measures may be less effective at detecting dangerous items.”

Safran Group's Morpho Detection unit has a $355.2 million contract with TSA to maintain 656 of its explosive detection systems that screen checked bags. Shown here is Safran's CTX 9800 DSi EDS system. Photo: Safran
Safran Group’s Morpho Detection unit has a $355.2 million contract with TSA to maintain 656 of its explosive detection systems that screen checked bags. Shown here is Safran’s CTX 9800 DSi EDS system. Photo: Safran

Through January 2014, TSA contracted with four companies for equipment maintenance, Germany’s Siemens, the Morpho Detection business of France’s Safran Group, L-3 Communications [LLL], and Leidos [LDOS]. In FY ’14 TSA spent $251 million on maintenance activities with its contractors.

Siemens’ contract, which expired Jan. 31, 2014, was valued at $429 million over five years. Morpho’s contract is valued at $355.2 million over four years, L-3’s $310 million over four years, and Leidos’ $135.9 million over five years. The contracts exclude one with Leidos, which replaced Siemens in February 2014 for maintenance responsibility for checkpoint screening equipment.

In the area of corrective maintenance, which is performed by contractors, the IG says that TSA couldn’t demonstrate that it validates contractor-reported corrective maintenance data and doesn’t “consistently enforce its own requirement that local TSA personnel acknowledge corrective maintenance actions have been completed and equipment is ready for operational use.”

Basic preventive maintenance, called Level I, is performed by local TSA personnel daily or weekly, while more involved preventive maintenance, which is Level II, is performed by contractors monthly, quarterly or annually. The IG says TSA doesn’t provide “sufficient guidance” to its local employees on how to “properly document, track, and maintain Level I preventative maintenance actions.”

As with corrective maintenance data reported by contractors, TSA also doesn’t “ensure that contractor-reported data on Level II preventive maintenance is accurate,” the IT says. The report also says there is no penalty structure if contractors fail to do preventive maintenance on time.

TSA agreed a year ago to improve and standardize its oversight of preventive maintenance and is still “refining the system,” the IG says.

TSA agreed with the IG’s recommendations, which include developing and using a preventive maintenance validation process, establish policies for local agency personnel to verify and document that contractors complete corrective actions, and include penalties in future screening equipment maintenance contracts for non-compliance.

Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), the ranking member on the House Homeland Security Committee, in a statement urged the TSA to “quickly” implement the IG’s recommendations.