Flaws persist in masterminding a multi-program, $2.8 billion yearly anti-smuggling detection system to block rogue nations and terrorists from mounting a nuclear attack on the United States, the Government Accountability Office stated in a report to Congress.
Scanners installed at overseas ports to check U.S.-bound cargo for nuclear weapons and materials aren’t sure to find all such contraband, for example.
The findings were contained in testimony presented to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
While the Missile Defense Agency is well along in providing a multi-layered shield against rogue states or terrorists using nuclear-tipped missiles to mount an atomic attack on U.S. cities, the other part of the equation — to block enemies from smuggling nukes into the United States — isn’t going well, according to the GAO report.
The GAO focused on an umbrella agency that is to coordinate multi-agency efforts to block smuggling, called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), an entity within the Department of Homeland Security. DNDO was established by a presidential directive in 2005.
The goal is to prevent rogue states or terrorists from smuggling nuclear weapons into the United States, blocking those enemies before the weapons ever get near U.S. shores. For example, screening detectors are being installed at foreign ports to scan cargo containers bound for the United States to see if they contain concealed contraband weapons, before those containers are loaded onto ships bound for U.S. ports.
On the one hand, DNDO has been well to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, but the agency lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture, GAO found.
Agencies involved in the effort, which DNDO is supposed to coordinate, include the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State).
Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating with DOD, DOE, and State to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material. A nuclear bomb creates an immense explosion as fissile materials reach critical mass, while a radiological or "dirty" bomb merely uses a conventional explosive to scatter radioactive materials about an area.
DNDO has identified gaps in the protective architecture, such as land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation, gaps through which enemies easily could move nuclear weapons.
Although DNDO has started to develop programs to address these gaps, it has not yet developed an overarching strategic plan to guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture, GAO found. For example, such a plan would define across the entire architecture how DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between points of entry. The plan also would define steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals.
DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges.
First, prior GAO reports found that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been effectively coordinated, although there have been some improvements in this area.
Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection.
Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing implementation of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge for DNDO in ensuring that individual programs within the global architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated to maximize the detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material.
Some $2.8 billion was budgeted in the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2007, for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture, according to DNDO figures, the GAO noted.
Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was devoted to programs to support detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and detection activities within the United States; and about $575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities.
And those figures may climb still higher, the GAO cautioned. Future costs for DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts.
DNDO is charged with developing a global nuclear detection architecture — an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. The office implements the domestic portion of the architecture, while DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for related programs outside the U.S.
GAO recommends that DNDO work with DOD, DOE, and State to establish a strategic plan to guide agency efforts to develop a more comprehensive architecture. In commenting on a draft of this statement, DNDO concurred with this recommendation.
The GAO report titled "Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture" can be read in full by going to http://www.gao.gov on the Web.