Pilots at the controls of an American Airlines Boeing 757 en route from Seattle to New York on September 22 had to switch to backup battery power after they lost all electrical power while in cruise flight over Michigan.
Those batteries are designed to supply power to the airliner for only about 30 minutes, but the jetliner stayed airborne for over two hours until the flight deck crew made an emergency landing at Chicago O’Hare International.
But as Flight 268 approached, the two pilots found that several flight control systems and engine thrust reversers were not working to sufficiently slow the B-757-200 during touchdown. The pilots had drained the battery backup system, leaving inoperable the vital systems that help stop a jet.
The jetliner skidded down the length of the runway and due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane approximately 100 feet from the end of the blast pad pavement, which extends nearly 400 feet past the departure end of the runway. None of the185 passengers or seven crewmembers was injured.
The full story of what happened on that transcontinental flight from was not known until late October, when the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its preliminary report on the potentially disastrous event.
The NTSB preliminary report gave this chilling account of what happened:
On September 22, 2008, at 1342 central daylight time, a Boeing 757-223 (N197AN) operated by American Airlines as Flight 268, diverted to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) due to electrical system anomalies.
During the landing on runway 22R (7,500 feet by 150 feet), the airplane veered off the left side of the runway resulting in minor damage to the landing gear. There were no injuries to the two flight crew, five flight attendants, or 185 passengers.
The flight originated from the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, at 0802 pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York.
While en route the flight crew received an AIR/GRD SYS message, an illumination of the standby power bus OFF light, and several advisory and status messages on the engine indicating and crew alert system (EICAS). The flight crew then referenced the quick reference handbook (QRH) regarding the AIR/GND SYS message. The flight crew then followed the procedure referenced in the QRH for STANDBY BUS OFF by turning the standby power selector to the BAT position. The QRH procedure also referenced that, “The battery will provide bus power for approximately 30 minutes.”
The airplane systems stabilized with several items inoperative and the captain contacted maintenance technical support and subsequently elected to continue the flight on battery power. The flight crew then reviewed the MAIN BATTERY CHARGER procedure referenced in the QRH.
Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes later, while in cruise flight, the battery power was depleted at which time several cockpit electrical systems began to fail. The flight attendants discovered that public address (PA) and the cabin/cockpit interphone systems were inoperative. A flight attendant wrote a note and slipped it under the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of their communication problems.
The airplane was over western Michigan and the captain elected to turn around and divert to ORD.
While aligned with the runway to land, the flight crew declared an emergency with the control tower as a precaution.
As the airplane neared the runway on final approach, the flight crew discovered that the elevator and standby elevator trim systems were inoperative. The captain then assisted the first officer on the flight controls and the approach to land was continued. The systems required to slow the airplane on the runway appeared to indicate normal, and with the elevator control issues the flight crew did not want to perform a go-around to land on a longer runway. Pitch control of the airplane was difficult so the flight crew elected to stop the flap extension at 20 degrees.
The touchdown was smooth despite the control issues, however, the thrust reversers and spoilers did not deploy. The captain attempted to manually deploy the thrust reversers, but still was not sure if they deployed. The captain was concerned about the brake functionality and accumulator pressure so he made one smooth application of the brakes, which did not “perform well.” Due to obstructions off the end of the runway, the captain elected to veer the airplane off the left side of the runway into the grass.
As the airplane touched down approximately 2,500 feet down the runway witnesses heard loud pops. Skid marks from the left main gear were evident near the point of touchdown and 165 feet further down the runway skid marks from the right main gear were present. These skid marks were visible for the entire length of the runway up until the airplane departed the pavement. The airplane came to rest with all three main landing gear off the left side of the pavement and the nose of the airplane came to rest approximately 100 feet prior to the end of the blast pad pavement which extended 397 feet past the departure end of the runway.
After coming to a stop, the flight crew was not able to shut the engines down with either the fuel cutoff valves or by extending the fire handles. The engines were subsequently shutdown by depressing the fire handles. The passengers were then deplaned through the L1 and R4 doors using portable stairs.
Post incident investigation revealed a failure of the B1/B2 contacts in the K106 electrical relay. With the standby power selector in the AUTO position, this failure would have resulted in a loss of power to the battery bus and the DC standby bus, which would have resulted in the AIR/GND SYS message and illumination of the standby power bus OFF light that the flight crew received.
With the standby power selector in the BAT position, as selected by the flight crew, the main battery provided power to the hot battery bus, the battery bus, the AC standby bus, and the DC standby bus. In addition, the main battery charger was not receiving power, and thus the battery was not being recharged. When main battery power was depleted, all 4 of the aforementioned buses became unpowered.
The incident remains under investigation by the NTSB, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and American Airlines. American and its pilots union, the Allied Pilots Association, declined to comment while the case remains under investigation.