A new report suggests that perhaps nations such as China can be dissuaded from any headlong rush to build a formidable force with a global military reach.
The report was issued by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a Washington defense-oriented think tank, coauthored by Andrew F. Krepinevich, CSBA president, and Robert C. Martinage, a CSBA senior fellow.
With dissuasion, the United States would attempt to change the Chinese calculus of risks, so that it perceives either high costs or meager benefits from developing, expanding or transferring a military capability that would threaten the United States.
That approach is in contrast to sitting back and watching China develop significant capabilities, and then attempting to react by mounting a campaign of deterrence, attempting to deter China from using those assets against the United States or its interests.
In the past decade, China — flush with money from its trade surplus with the United States running to more than $200 billion a year currently — has embarked upon a lavish military buildup.
It has purchased or developed eight different classes of submarines, including the Jin Class that is nuclear powered (limitless range) and carries nuclear missiles with a range of almost 5,000 miles; Sovremenny Class destroyers; upgraded land forces; cutting-edge tactical aircraft and long-range bombers; land-based nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the United States from bases in mainland China; and more than 1,300 radar-guided missiles aimed toward Taiwan that bar any U.S. Navy move to send aircraft carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait to defend the island against a promised invasion.
Before coming to aid Taiwan, U.S. forces would need radar-evading platforms, such as the F-22 Raptor supercruise, super-stealth fighter, the next-generation DDG-1000 Class destroyer, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), a coastal fighter, to take out Chinese military assets.
However, the Raptor buy is being cut off at 183, or perhaps 203 if a plus-up gains approval, while the Air Force says it requires 381, which is about half the 750 original buy. The DDG-1000 Class may be cut off at two demonstration ships (following the Arleigh Burke Class of destroyers numbering more than 60 ships). And the LCS is stuck at two ships over cost disputes, even though with cost increases it still will cost about one-sixth the price of a destroyer.
The Pentagon also won’t soon buy a new aerial refueling tanker plane, more C-17 cargo planes, and more.
Pentagon leaders are concerned, wondering why China needs a strategic military force with global reach when it claims the buildup is just to help invade Taiwan, 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, or to guard sea lanes already guarded by the U.S. Navy.
While clearly China is well along with its buildup, perhaps it could be dissuaded from further arms procurement, the report suggests.
The United States previously has used dissuasion with some success, such as pushing Libya to cease attempts to build a chemical weapons arsenal, pushing Taiwan to drop plans to develop a nuclear weapon, and maneuvering the former Soviet Union to invest in military hardware in areas less threatening to the United States and its allies, the report states.
The report recommends that a Senior Dissuasion Strategy Group (SDSG) be created within the Department of Defense to implement dissuasion strategy.
“Ultimately, the development and application of dissuasion strategies should be the province of the secretary of defense, a small number of senior defense decision-makers, and a small analytic staff,” according to the report.
Group members should include the most senior defense leaders, including the secretary of defense, deputy secretary of defense, the undersecretaries for policy, intelligence and acquisition, and the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Entitled “Dissuasion Strategy vis-a-vis China” and running 54 pages, the CSBA report may be viewed in full at http://www.csbaonline.org on the Web.