The Marine Corps has agreed to recalibrate the troop-carrying capacity of the amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) so its operation and maintenance cost can be more accurately compared to the vehicle it eventually will replace.
In a report on ACV released April 18, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the Marine Corps was comparing the vehicle on a one-to-one basis with the legacy assault amphibious vehicle (AAV). But the legacy AAV carries 17 Marines while its replacement can hold up to 13 troops but no fewer than 10.
GAO found that “a comparison of Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) to ACV 1.1 operations and support costs reported by DOD to Congress … may be overstating comparison AAV costs as a result of an underlying assumption relating to troop carrying capacity.”
The most recent Selected Acquisition Report compares the cost of 204 ACVs with the same number of AAVs, implying plans for a one-for-one replacement. However, “comparatively more ACVs may be required because they are expected to carry fewer Marines,” GAO found.
ACV program officials informed GAO that only 180 AAVs would likely be replaced by the incoming 204 ACV 1.1s, according to GAO. Without revising the assumption, DOD may overstate the operations and support costs savings that may be realized through acquisition of the ACV 1.1.
GAO recommended the Marine Corps alter their cost reporting to reflect plans to replace 180 AAVs with 204 ACVs.
GAO also suggested delaying a milestone C production decision on ACV 1.1 until fiscal 2019 “in order to reduce concurrency between testing and production.”
ACV 1.1 is on an aggressive acquisition schedule with relatively low risk because the Marine Corps insisted on non-developmental, technologically mature prototypes that it could test quickly, choose between and field.
GAO found that the speedy development scheduled increases concurrency of testing and low-rate initial production, which could mean that deficiencies found in later testing could require retroactive fixes in some production vehicles. That could result in “potentially requiring costly modifications,” GAO found.
“Further, the current schedule for the production decision could weaken Congressional oversight as Congress will likely be deciding whether to provide funds for ACV production before results from developmental testing are available,” GAO found. “Postponing the program’s production decision until early fiscal year 2019 would reduce concurrency and enable Congress to obtain sufficient knowledge prior to making a procurement funding decision.”
The Defense Department agreed to the recalculation, but did not concur with the suggestion that a milestone B decision to begin production be delayed to lessen concurrency. In a written response to GAO published along with the report, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Dyke Weatherington said pushing back the production decision would have a domino effect on the Marine Corps’ larger modernization plans.
“Delaying the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Increment 1 Phase 1 Milestone C decision will have a negative effect on the Marine modernization and affordability of Marine Corps’ Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Replacement Strategy,” Weatherington wrote.
The Defense Department said any overlap of testing and production is low risk and that funding has been budgeted to perform any necessary corrective action on low-rate initial production vehicles produced before testing concludes.
“Based on the technical maturation of these systems, corrective actions are not anticipated to be major vehicle changes,” DoD responded.