By Geoff Fein
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) has asked the Navy to provide him data comparing costs between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 as well as documentation supporting the Navy’s assertion that the plan to restart the Arleigh Burke class of destroyers would be budget neutral.
Because of the questions surrounding the Navy’s decision to go back to DDG-51, which, according to service officials, were based on rapid changes in the global security environment that outstripped the capability set that DDG-1000 was designed to combat, Kennedy is asking for an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the two destroyers.
“I believe this would entail providing complete cost data on a DDG-51, as envisioned by the Navy after restart of the production line, and on a DDG-1000 that has modifications the Navy believes are critical to perform the ballistic missile defense (BMD), area-defense anti-air warfare and blue-water anti-submarine warfare missions driving the Navy’s desire to shift between platforms,” Kennedy said in an Oct. 24 letter to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead.
The Navy should provide cost estimates that assume: improvements are made to the dual band radar only as necessary to give the ship capabilities comparable to the radar envisioned for restarted DDG-51s; and improvements are made that would reflect a growth path to greater capability while the Navy is waiting on the CG(X) program, Kennedy added.
Additionally, Kennedy questions the Navy’s assertion that the plan to restart DDG-51 production would be budget neutral.
“Even if that were the case, it is not clear to me that the ‘budget neutral’ plan is neutral when it comes to funding the workload necessary to support the surface combatant industrial base,” he said. “Therefore, I would like to see how many DDG-51s you plan to procure, budget quality estimates for that plan, what effect that plan would have on the surface combatant industrial base, and any associated termination costs while the Navy waits to begin building the CG(X) in 2017,” Kennedy said.
The Massachusetts senator also noted that a number of questions have yet to be answered in regard to the Navy’s decision to cap production of DDG-1000 and restart the DDG-51 line.
According to Kennedy, Congress has yet to see:
- intelligence analysis reflecting the coordinated assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency supporting these changes to the mix of platforms;
- validation of this shift that is supported by reviews by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for an Acquisition Category I program;
- an approved acquisition strategy for cruisers and destroyers that supports the approved requirements baseline and is consistent with the previous Navy studies on what investment is required to support the surface combatant industrial base;
- evidence that potential changes in the shipbuilding program reflect: modeling and simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness; assessments of platform operational availability; and cost savings or penalties from changed vessel manning levels to accomplish missions;
- verification by the commanders of the combatant commands that the Navy’s currently preferred program would be better than the Navy’s previously preferred shipbuilding program in meeting their future mission requirements.
Additionally, Kennedy noted that Congress has also yet to see any analysis to support the Navy’s contention that DDG-51 will offer greater ballistic missile defense, advanced anti-ship cruise missile defense, and blue-water anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and that the service couldn’t afford to make DDG-1000 capable of supporting the same missions.
Kennedy pointed to testimony Vice Adm. Barry McCullough, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources, gave to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower in July.
“Modifying the DDG-1000s to support these missions is unaffordable from the Navy’s standpoint,” McCullough said at the hearing.
McCullough made a similar statement in September at a Surface Navy Association luncheon (Defense Daily, Sept. 17).
“The Congress still has not seen the analysis to support this statement,” Kennedy said in his letter to Roughead.
“Even if we are to believe that there is an excess of capacity relative to the fire support requirement, it is not clear to me that the Navy’s path forward makes the most sense,” Kennedy added.
Kennedy said it’s his understanding that:
- the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is included in the baseline and relatively modest research and development would allow the ship to also employ SM-3 and SM-6 missiles in a ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission;
- the DDG-1000 could be further optimized for the ballistic missile defense mission through combat systems modifications and by perhaps deleting the Advanced Gun System and replacing it with additional missile tubes;
- the DDG-1000 radar has more potential for improvement to achieve capability required to support more a robust BMD mission, as compared to the radar on DDG-51;
- the DDG-1000 Operational Requirements Document already articulates a recruitment to provide area air defense capability and that the advances in capability provided by the dual band radar are well suited to counter the Hezebollah threat often cited;
- the DDG-1000 has an integrated undersea warfare suite that is not only capable of blue water and littoral anti-submarine warfare, but is also capable of in-stride mine avoidance; and
- the DDG-1000 platform has more growth potential for carrying bigger, more capable radars and other new sensors and weapons.
Kennedy also raised concerns with the path forward for the Navy’s next cruiser, CG(X).
Earlier this year at an American Society of Naval Engineers conference, then head of Naval Sea Systems Command, Vice Adm. Paul Sullivan told conference attendees the Navy would be moving CG(X)’s schedule to the right. The Navy’s 30-year ship building plan had called for CG(X) procurement to begin in 2011 (Defense Daily, June 24).
On Oct. 28, Capt. John Sorce, deputy director surface ships, told attendees at the annual Surface Navy Association communications forum that CG(X) procurement has been pushed outside the future years defense plan (FYDP) to a procurement date in the FY ’17 time frame.
The Navy completed its analysis of alternatives (AoA) in January, and after review by senior Navy leadership this spring, it was delivered to Pentagon officials, Sorce added. The Navy is still awaiting word on which alternative has been chosen.
With CG(X)’s procurement now pushed out at least eight years, the Navy is looking at several options to fill any potential gap.
In his Oct. 24 letter to Roughead, Kennedy said the path forward for CG(X) “is even cloudier than it was when we began the year.”
Just as with DDG-51 and DDG-1000, Kennedy noted the Navy has yet to provide Congress with insight into the results of the CG(X) AoA; any analysis defining the differences in cost and schedule arising from the need to accommodate new sensors and weapons to counter the newly defined future threats, as compared with the cost and schedule of the ’09 shipbuilding program; a technology road map for transitioning to CG(X) that replaces the Navy’s previously preferred alternative of using DDG-1000 as a baseline for such a transition; or any joint analysis by the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency setting forth additional requirements for investment in Aegis BMD systems beyond those programmed in the budget request for FY ’09 and the Future Years Defense Plan.