Only new air transports must be fitted with 16 G seats fully compliant with current rules, according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Its final rule, published Sept. 27 in the Federal Register, avoids a costly retrofit program that was largely opposed by industry.
The failure to mandate retrofit will doubtless be deeply disturbing to many advocates of air safety, but the FAA believes that the increasing proliferation of 16 G “compatible” seats, the retirement of aircraft fitted with 9 G seats, and the cost-benefit of equipping only new airliners with the fully compliant seats represents the best course.
The FAA action brings to a close some 17 years of rulemaking activity on the matter. Supporters of the FAA’s action will say it represents the best compromise in an industry reeling from economic losses and ill-prepared to embark on a costly seat and cabin retrofit program. Critics will doubtless say the FAA’s action does not meet the intent of Congress and, worse, represents a caving in to the industry that upgrades seats routinely for marketing purposes.
First, a brief explanation of the seats involved:
- 9 G seats: Capable of withstanding nine times the force of gravity – an upgrade from the earlier 6 G requirement, but no longer good enough for airliners as the rating involved static testing only.
- 16 G: Tested dynamically to measure both forward and downward forces, to include the restraint system, and the forces on seat floor tracks representative of those used on the airplane installation. Includes several occupant protection criteria not applied to 9 G seats, to include head, leg and spine injuries, as measured by a test dummy.
- 16 G compatible: Applies mostly to derivative aircraft, such as the Boeing [BA] B737 Next Generation, and does not meet the occupant protection requirement regarding head, leg and spine injuries.
The FAA looked at two options: Requiring full 16 G seats in newly manufactured airplanes only, and requiring full 16 G seats in both newly manufactured aircraft and in all other in-service airplanes (the retrofit portion of the fleet).
Based on comments received from the industry about the costs involved, the FAA said it revisited the retrofit requirement. It decided to drop it, meaning that airplanes with 16 G compatible seats will remain unaffected by this ruling. Rather, the new ruling requiring fully compatible 16 G seats will only be required for new jetliners entering production in four years.
The FAA justifies this action based on a number of factors:
- The accelerated retirement post-9/11 of many pre-1992 manufactured airplanes that are gas guzzlers and require more maintenance, such as the B727, B737 and B747 classics, DC- 9, DC-10 and MD-80 aircraft, which will take many 9 G seats out of service.
- The growing popularity of regional jets, another post-9/11 phenomenon, which will increase the proportion of 16 G and 16 G compatible seats in the fleet.
- The greater costs and efforts needed to certify fully compliant 16 G seats. Not just the seats, but their placement in the aircraft must be considered. For example, the FAA says that “upgrading existing airplanes to meet [FAR 25.562, the full 16 G requirement] may require modification and substantiation of a range of seat pitches” and so forth.
- Equipping only new production aircraft with fully compliant 16 G seats for passengers and flight attendants passes the cost-benefit test. The new seats will cost the industry an estimated $34.7 million. The benefit, in terms of deaths and injuries avoided, was placed at $78.9 million. Thus, the new rule has a benefit to cost ratio of 2.27 to 1. “Therefore, the FAA contends that the quantifiable benefits of the rule adequately justify the costs of the rule,” the FAA final rule declared.
This decision comes after the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in May 1988, and a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) in October 2002, which proposed a 14-year retrofit of the existing fleet (thereby providing ample time for the job, the source of much industry unhappiness with the original NPRM).
Many objected to the time allowed for retrofit. The Association of Flight Attendants’ (AFA) reaction was typical: “This proposed 14-year retrofit of new crashworthy seat standards on in-service aircraft is not acceptable and unnecessarily endangers the safety of the traveling public as well as our flight attendant members.”
Other commentators argued that the rule itself was flawed, in that it did not require three-point restraints (the lap and shoulder belts found in automobiles), which left occupants vulnerable to flailing injuries. Others argued that passenger seats, like those for flight attendants, should be designed to face backward, thereby providing increased passenger safety irrespective of lap and shoulder belts. However, providing a fully 16 G compliant rearward facing seat would require a strengthening of the seatback and floor, problems that the commentators were unaware of.
Others argued that progress in airliner occupant protection lags that demonstrated for automobiles, and that the FAA as a regulatory body simply isn’t being sufficiently proactive. The comparison with the automobile industry may not be entirely appropriate. Cars last 7-10 years, whereas airplanes can be in service for 30 years or more. Automobile manufacturers are not faced with massive retrofit costs attendant to upgrading occupant protection systems.
This much is clear from comments in the docket: many observers note the belated effort to improve the survival of adults while not addressing the vulnerability of infants under two years of age. The FAA recently declared that child restraints will not be mandated (see ASW, Sept. 12).
This latest action marks the third time in recent weeks that the FAA has not moved ahead on a proposed safety initiative. In addition to child restraint systems, the FAA also nixed sweeping changes to its service difficulty report (SDR) system (see ASW, Sept. 26).