Reaction: ‘There is no price on safety unless it is outside the budget!’
When the demand for flying is greatest, the airplanes will sit grounded. That is the practical effect of a U.S. Forest Service decision May 10 to cancel contracts for the heavy airtankers it has employed for many years to fight fires in Western states.
The decision comes less than two weeks after the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that the Forest Service and the Department of Interior (DOI) “are primarily responsible for ensuring the safety of these operatons,” and recommended that the structural airworthiness of the fleet of firefighting tankers must be assured to keep them flying, and that safety oversight must be strengthened greatly (see ASW May 10).
The decision is analogous to grounding a commercial airline during the height of Holiday Season flying, when demand for air travel is at its peak. For aerial firefighting aircraft, spring and summer are the times of greatest demand, when fires can spread across woodland and brush dried by years of drought. For its heaviest initial attack on such fires, the Forest Service has relied on modified ex-military aircraft flown by contract operators. The airplanes fly through convective turbulence to dump thousands of gallons of fire suppressant on flames marching across wildlands. The decision to void the contracts is a stark illustration of the balance between meeting the demands of a mission while doing so in a safe manner.
Some commercial airlines have come close to grounding, as was apprehended in the months after the January 2000 crash of an Alaska Airlines [ALK] jet, when shortcomings were uncovered in the airline’s maintenance operation (see ASW, June 12, 2000).
In the case of the aerial firefighters, some 33 multi-engine air tankers are at issue. They are the remaining fleet, since three others have crashed in firefighting missions since 1994, a fatal accident rate of one every three years, on average – a very high rate for such a small fleet. Eleven of the large air tankers were permanently taken out of service following release of the Blue Ribbon Panel report in December 2002.
In announcing the contract cancellation, Dale Bosworth, chief of the Forest Service, said, “Safety is a core value of the firefighting community and it is non-negotiable.”
“Clearly, the days of operating older aircraft of unknown airworthiness for firefighting operations are over,” he said. The heavy airtankers averaged 48 years of age, with some up to 60 years old.
As an alternative, Bosworth explained that a mixed fleet of more than 400 helicopters, single-engine airtankers (SEATS) and eight U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) will be available for the 2004 firefighting season, which portends to be one of the most dangerous in years because of the prolonged drought.
However, the 33 heavy aerial tankers, now not available, constituted 80-90 percent of the initial attack capability, as measured by these airplanes’ range and payload capability, according to sources. The decision to, in effect, ground the big tankers was controversial in the aerial firefighting community.
The Forest Service decision was hailed as “bold and courageous” by former NTSB Chairman James Hall, who also served as co-chair of the 2002 Blue Ribbon Commission that examined the safety record of the aerial firefighter fleet. This inquiry concluded there was no assurance that old military airplanes were safe to fly as air tankers (see ASW, Dec. 9, 2002).
In a telephone interview with ASW, Hall said the Forest Service decision to cancel contracts will have repercussions on the operators and certainly will impact on the Forest Service’s ability to “suppress fires in the short term.”
“But this action is long overdue, and it may be the only way to get Congress to provide support for a fleet of aircraft appropriate for this unique and demanding mission,” Hall declared. In testimony to Congress last week, Hall said the situation is one where “safety cannot be assured; it is one where safety must be restored.”
In the meantime, the contractors providing the air tankers are in a critical situation. Neptune Aviation Services of Missoula, Mont., fielded eight of the 33 airplanes. Greg Jones, the company’s director of operations and maintenance, said in a telephone interview that the near-term effect is “devastating.”
“There’s no income. The company went into this fire season expecting to go to work,” he said. Jones explained that the company ate into its cash reserves preparing for the heavy flying season.
According to Forest Service documents, during the 2003 fire season, contract operators were paid about $30 million for their work. As part of the 2004 contract cancellation, the Forest Service announced that it expects to pay some $10 million to the companies involved “for costs associated with preparing to fulfill the 2004 contract, such as inspections, training, maintenance and overhead.”
Jones asserted that the $10 million in announced compensation costs for all operators is not likely to be sufficient.
Significantly, the NTSB did not recommend discontinuing the use of large airtankers. Rather, the NTSB was seeking proper safety management and oversight. In justifying its decision to cancel contracts, the Forest Service said, “Since the fire season is upon us, there is little decision space in responding to their safety recommendations.”
“Neither the Forest Service nor the DOI [Department of Interior] has the inspection and maintenance capabilities outlined by the NTSB, so they decided to terminate the contract and avoid using aircraft that cannot be documented as airworthy,” the Forest Service statement explained.
Evidence for the lack of resident experience comes from an examination of the Forest Service telephone book. Of the 13 positions listed for the Fire and Aviation Management office, four are vacant, including that of the aviation maintenance manager.
Douglas Herlihy, a former NTSB accident investigator, believes that the focus on the aging structure of the aerial tankers does not take into account the full spectrum of safety issues. The crews routinely were flying the airplanes above certificated airspeeds during their bombing runs on fires. Some of the stresses on the airplanes were crew- induced, Herlihy maintained.
In an interview, Herlihy suggested that some operators, such as Neptune, have maintained their airplanes in structurally sound and airworthy condition, intimating that the contract cancellation was premature.
Neptune operates onetime U.S. Navy P2-V patrol airplanes. A former P2-V pilot noted that in military service these patrol airplanes operated for many hours at low altitude over the ocean, exposing them to the vicissitudes of salt corrosion. Moreover, their turbo-compound radial piston engines are very complicated to operate and to maintain.
“The airplanes would be complex and hazardous to operate for anyone without loads of experience on them and, even stripped of military gear, they have many systems to maintain in comparison with a C-130’s relatively simple operation,” this veteran P2-V pilot said.
On the other hand, the C-130 may not be the best choice for low-level work among the sharp gusts of turbulence, in part because the single row of rivets may concentrate structural stresses.
In terms of maintenance, while Herlihy hailed the quality of maintenance at Neptune Air Services, it should be noted that the operator, unlike a passenger airline, is not required to maintain a continuing analysis and surveillance system (CASS).
“Our airworthness is monitored by the FAA,” Jones said. While CASS is not required, the company has full FAA repair station certification and is capable of overhauling its engines, as well as machining parts based on the manufacturer’s original engineering drawings.
Nonetheless, the Forest Service has concluded that it does not have the capability to provide effective oversight. >> Hall, e-mail: [email protected]; Herlihy, e-mail: [email protected]; Jones, tel. 406/542-0606 <<
Controversy Over Contract Cancellation
A selection of reactions on a forum for air tanker crew sentiments:
- “It seems to me that the present situation is due in large part to trying to do things on the cheap. Now the burden will be borne by helicopters, many of which are not spring chickens and have an absolutely high maintenance cost.”
- “The decision to cease heavies was based on the recommendations of the NTSB to increase inspections to make the industry safer, and to create a responsible entity to police and enforce that issue. The DOI and the FS have chosen to say NOT ME to that suggestion, when they could have taken a proactive role in the establishment of a cooperative effort to petition the DOD and the FAA to work together to find, certify and provide newer aircraft more suited to the industry.”
- “The NTSB report gave recommendations to improve safety, not to ground the fleet.
“As a taxpayer, I do not want to pay for the slow moving rotorwing to make its way across country, stopping to get repaired along the way, as a replacement for heavy fixed-wing air tankers (six year helicopter maintenance background speaking).”
- “If the Forest Service is going to change the way it contracts aerial firefighting services, then it needs to look at the performance and age of its equipment.
“Of course, all this costs money and, as everyone knows, there is no price on safety unless it is outside the budget!”
Source: http://airtanker.com
‘Not Subjected to Rigorous Certification and Continuing Airworthiness Oversight’
May 13 testimony to Forest Health Subcommittee of former NTSB Chairman and Blue Ribbon Panel co-chair James Hall (extracts):
“Two main factors are bringing about the suspension of the use of the large air tankers. First, the reluctance or inability of the FAA to assume the full extent of the role for the oversight of public aircraft. Second, there is the understandable absence of inspection and maintenance capabilities in the land and forest management agencies.
“Some of the operators may do more than is required to protect their investment. Still, there is no overall inspection and maintenance standard for the industry. The result is that, from the beginning, the risks and accident rates were seen as high and, more recently, as unacceptable.
“The Panel’s report noted that the government is accepting a lower standard of safety for contracted large air tanker crews than it does for its own employees. The Occupational Safety & Health Administration [OSHA] requires that all U.S. employees be provided a safe workplace. Public aircraft operations operate under exceptions to OSHA rules and regulation. Operators of public aircraft, including firefighting air tankers, are covered by lower standards than any other sector of U.S. aviation. Clearly, that double standard should not be permitted to continue. A short-term risk of impaired operational capability must be accepted if it is necessary to assure the safety of an operation that is intolerably risky.
“The FAA has abrogated any responsibility to ensure the continuing airworthiness of ‘public use’ aircraft. It is difficult to understand how the United States, with the most sophisticated and professionally competent airworthiness authority in the world, is content to have elements of its aviation community not subjected to rigorous certification and continuing airworthiness oversight.”
Lessons Not Learned
May 13 statement of Douglas Herlihy to Forest Health Subcommittee of the Health Resources Committee (extracts):
“The C-130A aircraft lost in the breakup events of 1994 and 2002 show remarkable similarity, in service hours and modification. According to the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board], both …airplanes were modified with 3,000-gallon slurry drop tanks. Hemet Valley Flying Service of California designed and installed the structure at their facility. At the time these aircraft were modified, the FAA-approved STC [supplemental type certificate] limited the airplane to a gross weight of 120,000 pounds, but allowed the airplane to be loaded with a full 3,000 gallons of retardant (depending on the solution, the slurry may weigh between 9 and 11 pounds per gallon). Calculations easily show that the C-130A airplanes configured with a cargo capacity approximating 30,000 pounds left little more margin than for 15,000 pounds of fuel allowable in the wings.
“The Lockheed C-130A Flight Manual cautions:
‘During maneuvering and flight through turbulent air, additional loads are imposed on the airplane. As the payload is increased, the wings become more vulnerable to the loads imposed by turbulence, sudden control movements, or excessive angles of bank.’
“These cautions were intended for a brand-new, zero-time airplane. The up-bending of the center wing section (due to light fuel loads and heavy cargo loads) places the top skin in compression, and the bottom skin in tension.
“The unique construction of the box-type stringer-to-skin design, allows for a single row of rivet holes to be drilled and rivets to be placed all along this structure. This design is somewhat different than the construction of other airplanes. Both the Pearblossom [Calif.] and Walker [Calif.] accident aircraft were lost when their center wing sections failed in precisely the same location.”