The Army has repeatedly stated it stands behind its requirement for a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that would carry a full squad of nine soldiers to enhance infantry operations, and a new Rand Arroyo report shows this has long been a service goal.

“For over 50 years, (the Army) has tried to develop and field survivable, lethal (infantry fighting vehicles) IFVs that are capable of carrying a full infantry squad (numbering between nine and eleven men),” said the Rand report. “That has been a challenge, and the Army’s investment in the Bradley IFV compromised the capability to maintain a dismounted squad’s fire-and-maneuver capability in favor of cost efficiency and the lethality provided by the TOW missile system. 

While the report makes the case for the new combat vehicle, budget cuts and tough decisions for the land force make it likely the program will be delayed, though Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno repeatedly says the program is needed and the service must have it (Defense Daily, July 30).

A consistent lesson the service has learned since before World War II is that “the most basic infantry unit capability is the capacity to maneuver dismounted while covered by suppressive fire,” said the report, “Understanding Why a Ground Combat Vehicle That Carries Nine Dismounts Is Important to the Army.” This is fundamental and is the basic capability of the dismounted infantry squad.

The Bradley, produced by BAE Systems, was originally designed to carry nine infantrymen, but with the number of soldiers on board reduced to standardize the turret between infantry and cavalry versions of the vehicles and make room for TOWS, the infantry squad now is split between two vehicles and must re-form upon dismounting.

Additionally, lessons learned more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the vehicles were vulnerable to mines, rocket propelled grenades and IEDs.

With the cancellation of the Future Combat System in 2009, the Army began development of a new GCV to address operational deficiencies of the current Bradley (Defense Daily, June 12, 2009).

GCV Artist’s Conception  BAE Systems

Among the deficiencies that increase risk for the split squads and fire teams is the risk of exposure to fire and surveillance while reassembling outside the vehicles, which also become more exposed. Also, space is more constricted and more vehicles are needed if additional personnel–medics, civil affairs personnel, forward observers, translators–are required.

Report authors said the bottom line effect of splitting squads and fire teams reduces combat effectiveness. Also, reducing the numbers of soldiers in the squad causes problems. Each soldier has a specialty required for the squad to function properly and, if lost, so is a squad capability. Also, the squad requires a minimum number of soldiers to conduct fire and maneuver.

The report said that in Iraq and Afghanistan soldiers noted that “the loss of one or two soldiers disallowed effective fire and maneuver and in some cases led to the postponement of mission accomplishment. Terrain and leadership priorities that favored mounted maneuver added to problems.

The Bradley IFV performed well operationally as it was designed to fight and maneuver in support of tanks on a tank-vs. tank battlefield. But for the infantry, it was a compromise solution.

The report said replacing the Bradley IFV one-for-one with the GCV would provide four GCVs per mechanized infantry platoon. That “allows for the carrying of full nine-man squads (plus the three-man GCV crews) in a single vehicle,” the report said. “Three GCVs could, therefore, carry three complete mechanized infantry squads, and the fourth GCV can carry the platoon’s organic and attached enablers.”

The Army has contracted with BAE and General Dynamics [GD] for the GCV Technology Development Phase, and planned to choose one contractor in fiscal year 2014 for engineering and manufacturing development (Defense Daily, May 24, 2013).

“If developed as planned, the GCV will provide an infantry fighting vehicle that has the internal capacity the Army has been trying to develop since the 1960s and, moreover, one that can grow and adapt to accommodate future requirements,” the report said.

Find the report here: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR184.html.