The Defense Department spending watchdog recommends the Army cancel the significantly delayed XM25 shoulder-fired air-burst weapon program within 30 days unless it can justify the need for the weapon and the quantities it plans to procure.
A semiautomatic, shoulder-fired weapon that fires 25mm high-explosive, air-burst ammunition, the XM25 is designed to allow soldiers to fire at enemies in concealed positions at up to 500 meters. The program has experienced considerable delays, cost increases and performance failures since entering engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) in December 2010, according to the Defense Department Inspector General (DoD IG).
“Specifically, the XM25 program has experienced a total initial production decision delay of 5 years, from first quarter FY 2012 to planned first quarter FY 2017,” the IG wrote in an audit report of the program published Aug. 29. The delays have caused the system’s lifecycle cost to increase, but the amount by which was redacted from the report.
“We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, determine whether to proceed with or cancel the XM25 program after reviewing the results of the 2016 Governmental testing, and review and approve the binding affordability constraints developed by Army G-8 officials for the XM25 program within 30 days of the issuance of this report,” the IG wrote.
Also redacted from the report are the number of XM25s the Army plans to buy and costs associated with its continued development, fielding and sustainment. The weapon began technology development in May 2008 and was cleared for EMD in 2010. The estimated initial production decision was set for first quarter of fiscal year 2012 but now is expected in early fiscal 2017, five years late. A decision on whether to begin full-rate production is scheduled for mid-fiscal 2019, according to the IG.
Army officials removed XM25 procurement funding from the FY 2015 budget request and instead provided an additional two years of RDT&E funds, which extended the EMD phase by two years to further develop and test the XM25.
A previous IG report published in 2014 called for improved management of the program following a series of malfunctions that occurred during field testing of the weapon in Afghanistan that injured soldiers. As a result of the weapon malfunction, Army officials extended the development effort and XM25 research, development, test, and evaluation costs have increased from between February 2013 and March 2016, the IG said.
“Army officials at the Maneuver Center of Excellence in Fort Benning, Ga., did not conduct and maintain complete and verifiable analyses for determining the necessary XM25 procurement quantity,” the IG said. “Army officials did not justify the XM25 basis of issue plan and corresponding XM25 procurement quantity. This occurred because Army officials did not conduct and maintain complete and verifiable analyses for determining the necessary XM25 procurement quantity. As a result, the Army has no assurance that the estimated procurement quantity of systems, at an estimated cost of [redacted] , is valid.”
The IG recommended that the commander of the Maneuver Center of Excellence perform a comprehensive analysis “with factual and verifiable data to determine the necessary procurement quantities of the XM25 weapon.”