Poor passenger screening performance at airport checkpoints in the United States that was uncovered through covert testing was driven in large part on concerns about moving travelers through the security process quickly and efficiently to the detriment of security, the new administrator of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) said on Tuesday.
“A disproportionate focus on speed and efficiency in screening operations rather than security effectiveness powerfully influenced organizational culture and officer performance,” Peter Neffenger told the Senate Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee. “As a result, across TSA there was significant pressure to clear passengers quickly, often at the risk at not diligently resolving alarms.”
Neffenger’s conclusion is similar to comments in early June by a TSA official who told a different Senate panel that the agency was emphasizing passenger convenience at the expense of security (Defense Daily, June 9). Rebecca Roering, assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections at TSA, told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee then that low workforce morale and the hesitancy of Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to physically touch passengers to resolve alarms also created security risks.
Tuesday’s hearing was called to examine progress by TSA to address the findings of a just-completed classified report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (IG), which found failure rates of 95 percent related to covert smuggling of mock explosives and banned weapons on individuals through checkpoints.
“I think it’s fair to say that all of us agree that the results were extremely troubling,” Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), the ranking member on the subcommittee, said during here opening statement.
The specific technology involved in the failures was the body scanners, officially called Advanced Imaging Technology, or AIT. In May, before the leak of the IG’s preliminary audit results, DHS IG John Roth telegraphed the findings, telling the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that “early results” of the covert testing of the AIT systems show concern, namely “whether they’re effective (Defense Daily, May 13).”
Neffenger on Tuesday said the reviews by DHS and TSA show problems beyond the technology.
“Our conclusion is the screening effectiveness challenges were not merely a performance problem, not merely a process problem, nor were they a failure principally of the Advanced Imaging Technology,” Neffenger said. “Indeed, AITs have greatly enhanced out capability to detect non-metallic threats and they continue to perform to expected standards when used properly.”
Highlighting further the reasons behind the failures in addition to pressure to move passengers through checkpoints more with regard to speed than security, Neffenger said, “Strong drivers of the problem include leadership focus, environmental influences and gaps in system design and processes.” He added that “Our analysis also revealed that our officers did not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the equipment they were using. And several procedures were inadequate to resolve alarms. We’ve addressed these and we’ve trained our officers to understand and to use the equipment properly.”
Roth, also testifying on Tuesday, said it’s too early to judge the outcome of TSA’s and the department’s success in grappling with the failures but he praised the swiftness and comprehensiveness of the response, a far cry from the agency’s past response of often ignoring the IG’s reports that called for changes to correct various deficiencies.
“I will confess to a degree of frustration that TSA was assessing risk inappropriately and did not have the ability to perform basic management functions it needed in order to perform its crucial mission,” Roth said. “These issues were exacerbated in my judgment by a culture that resisted oversight and was unwilling to accept the need for change in the face of an evolving, serious threat.”
“We may be at a very different place than we were in recent months,” Roth said. “I am hopeful that Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new attitude about oversight. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort, but having the courage to critically assess these deficiencies in an honest and objective light is the first step and I believe TSA has taken that first step in recent months.”
Following the IG’s initial findings, TSA developed its own action plan to address the results. The plan contains dozens of actions and is supposed to be finished in March 2016.
Neffenger said that so far some actions that have been completed include ensuring that leaders at each airport overseeing AIT operations make sure procedures are complied with, all TSO’s complete “initial video-based training to reinforce proper alarm resolution,” doing same day debriefs with leaders and TSO’s around testing results and lessons learned, and conducting daily exercises of proper pat down procedures to “ensure optimal TSO performance.”
On top of the agency’s plan, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed a 10-point plan to address the IG’s findings. These include measures such as more manual screening, such as the reintroduction of handheld metal detectors, random explosives trace detection, revising standard operating procedures, retesting and re-evaluating the AIT systems and enhancing the systems, increased training, continued cover testing and other actions.
Neffenger said TSA is asking for funding for hardware and software upgrades to the AIT systems, which are supplied solely by L-3 Communications [LLL]. He said that L-3 has assured him of their “commitment” to solving the software challenges and “we’re holding them to account.”
He said the software upgrades are in initial testing and so far are promising but have to be put into the field. He said there is also the potential in the coming year for hardware upgrades to increase the resolution of the current systems.
The AIT systems use millimeter wave technology to scan a person for hidden items such as weapons and explosives.
Neffenger said there is a joint team of DHS and TSA officials that are monitoring the implementation of the DHS action plan and report to him and Johnson every two weeks.