Orbital ATK’s [OA] winning Joint Polar Satellite System-2 (JPSS-2) proposal should have been rejected by NASA as unacceptable due to the company’s “dual use” spare parts plan, Ball Aerospace [BLL] argued in its unsuccessful bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
According GAO’s public release from its July 16 protest denial, Ball specifically contended that the request for offers (RFO) expressly prohibited offerors from including costs for the Option 1 spacecraft, or what would be JPSS-3, in the funding profile for basic delivery order spacecraft, or JPSS-2. Ball said, therefore, Orbital’s proposal to buy during performance of the basic requirement a set of spare parts which could be applied to the option spacecraft if not used as spare parts for the basic satellite, was inconsistent with the solicitation limitation.
In her decision, GAO General Counsel Susan Poling wrote that Ball’s interpretation was inconsistent with the “plain language” of the solicitation. Poling also said GAO agreed with NASA that nothing precluded Orbital ATK’s “dual use” approach, in which the company would buy one complete set of spare parts (an extra “shipset”) that would be readily available to address the need for spares on JPSS-2. To the extent these spare parts are not used on JPSS-2, Orbital ATK would use them on JPSS-3 and JPSS-4, yet-to-be-exercised contract options for the program.
GAO said Ball’s plan, on the other hand, relied on “residual items” from the JPSS-1 mission, of which it is prime contractor, and “engineering model” spacecraft components as well as relationships with parts suppliers to ensure spare parts would be provided within an acceptable time frame to minimize schedule impact. Ball’s plan also envisioned procuring certain additional parts to serve as spares.
This seemed to play a factor in NASA’s decision, GAO said, because the source evaluation board rated Orbital ATK’s spare parts plan a “significant strength” due to greatly reduced technical and schedule risk, while rating Ball’s spares plan “marginally acceptable.” The spare parts issue falls under mission suitability, one of the three evaluation factors used by NASA, along with performance and price.
NASA ultimately rated Ball’s mission suitability with three significant strengths and seven strengths, while rating Orbital ATK’s mission suitability one significant strength and seven strengths. Mission suitability and price were approximately equal in importance to NASA, according to GAO. Poling wrote that GAO considered all of Ball’s assertions, but found that none furnished a basis for sustaining the protest.
The RFO required that offerors propose a spare-parts program that minimized the risk of a major schedule delay, defined as greater than three months, in the event of a part or component failing. A major schedule delay was also defined as inadvertent damage during assembly or testing based on the contractor’s historical experience, current practices and lessons learned from similar missions.
NASA in March awarded Orbital ATK a $253 million contract for JPSS-2, with a $130 million option for JPSS-3 and an $87 million option for JPSS-4. Ball filed its bid protest April 7, arguing that despite having a 15 percent higher total proposed price for the program, the company’s price for the single JPSS-2 satellite was $26 million less than Orbital’s proposal. Ball argued that it was unlikely NASA would execute the “distant” JPSS-4 option and that the company’s proposed price for the JPSS-2 and JPSS-3 satellites was less than Orbital’s.
NASA, overall, decided the significant price savings offered by Orbital ATK’s proposal “significantly outweighed” the technical advantage of Ball’s proposal and the price risk of Orbital ATK’s proposal in the event that the options are not exercised. Orbital ATK did not respond to a request for comment. Ball did not directly answer questions about the matter that were submitted by a reporter.
GAO said only Ball and Orbital ATK responded to the RFO for JPSS-2, which is a multi-mission cooperative program between NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to design, develop and fly the next series of polar-orbiting environmental-sensing satellites.