Members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on Thursday pushed two high-level Navy officials over recent ship collisions and how forward deploying forces in part contributed to recent mishaps in the Seventh Fleet area of operations this year.

At a joint hearing of the Seapower and Projection Forces and Readiness subcommittees, Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Rob Wittman (R-Va.) said these mishaps are directly related to having so many forward deployed ships, with the majority now not ready to perform their primary warfare areas.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) returns to Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka following a collision with a merchant vessel while operating southwest of Yokosuka, Japan. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released.
The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) returns to Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka following a collision with a merchant vessel while operating southwest of Yokosuka, Japan. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released.

In June the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided-missile destroyer, collided with a merchant vessel in the waters off Japan, causing severe damage and the deaths of several sailors. Then in August the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collided with a commercial vessel near the Straights of Malacca and Singapore (Defense Daily, Aug. 21).

Moreover, the USS Antietam (CG-54) was grounded in January and the USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) had a non-deadly collision with a South Korean fishing vessel in May.

“The material condition and the operational readiness of the ships are significantly degraded and not acceptable,” Wittman said. He added operational readiness trend lines for forward deployed ships “are deeply troubling.”

The chairman focused on how the Navy is prioritizing operational deployments over maintenance and modernization, which makes the material condition of forward deployed ships suffer.

“This maintenance and training model places sailors at risk and clearly contributed to the incidents that we witnessed in seventh fleet.”

Wittman also objected to how the Navy plans to increase the number of forward deployed ships in following years. “This increasing reliance on forward deployed ships is not sustainable and needd to be significantly modified.”

Wittman reiterated that the only long-term solution is to increase the total Navy force structure, moving to a 355-ship fleet.

“If we build the 355‐ship Navy then we will not be forced into inserting sailors into other higher risk environments,” he said.

However, in the short-term Wittman said the government must adequately fund training and provide the fleet with time to complete maintenance and training.

Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran partially agreed in his opening statement.

“In short, we continue to have a supply and demand problem which is placing a heavy strain on the force,” he said.

Moran said more forward deployed forces in places like the Western Pacific have helped limit capability restrictions with a smaller fleet, but even with this, “demand continues to grow, exposing these forces to the strains of persistently high operational tempo.”

Moran repeated a common refrain among the military that lower budgets due to the Budget Control Act (BCA) and nearly annual Continuing Resolutions (CRs) disrupt the Navy’s ability to recover capability.

However, he admitted that  “No matter how tough our operating environment, or how strained our budget, we shouldn’t be, and cannot be, colliding with other ships and running aground.”

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), chairman of the full committee, attended the hearing and asked Moran if he wanted to revise earlier statements that forward deployed ships were in better condition than those homeported in the U.S.

Moran said those statements were based on assumptions that because Japan-based forces were operating more frequently they were more practiced and ready. He admitted that was a wrong assumption and now does not know  precisely which forces are in better condition.

The Vice CNO highlighted that the Navy is still investigating the root causes of these mishaps and must find those before they can make clear longer-term determinations.

Visible damage to the USS John S. McCain’s (DDG-56) port side following a collision with the Alnic MC near the Straights of Malacca and Singapore. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released.
Visible damage to the USS John S. McCain’s (DDG-56) port side following a collision with the Alnic MC near the Straights of Malacca and Singapore. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released.

Ranking Member Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) noted a 2010 Navy review outlined readiness concerns that is “surprisingly relevant today.”

He said there is a growing number of forward deployed ships operating without proper maintenance and the personnel certification process needs to be reviewed and improved by an accountable decisionmarker.

Following the McCain collision, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson ordered an operational pause across the Navy. He also ordered a 60-day tactical comprehensive review of surface fleet operations and incidents over the past decade, and the secretary of the Navy has formed an independent subject matter expert panel for a larger strategic readiness review.

Rep. Donald Norcross (D-N.J.) pointedly asked why the operational pause did not happen after the first deadly collision, with the Fitzgerald?

“Sir, it should have,” Moran said. “For now the Navy leadership is waiting to receive the operational pause results. Every fleet commander was directed to provide feedback on what they learned, who took what action, and what kind of additional training may be necessary in the surface fleet.”

Moran said he would send the results to the committee once it is completed and he had it.