By Calvin Biesecker
In the wake of recent reports about federal airport security screeners failing to uncover most fake bombs taken through checkpoints by covert Red Teams, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) says the main reason these tests are done is to identify vulnerabilities in the security system.
“Many people think the purpose of covert testing is to catch an officer missing an object,” TSA says in a new posting to its Web site this week. “While this makes surprising headlines in newspapers and scares the public, the reality is that covert testing is a tool to identify vulnerabilities in the system and uncover weaknesses of training, procedures or technology. It is not designed to test an individual officer or airport but to act as a measure of system-wide effectiveness and drive improvement through training.”
Last month USA Today reported on a classified report it obtained about covert tests at three airports: O’Hare International in Chicago; Los Angeles International; and San Francisco International. In Chicago and Los Angeles TSA screeners missed about 60 percent and 75 percent of the fake bombs taken through the checkpoint respectively, the report said. At San Francisco, where private security contractors are used to man the checkpoints, about 20 percent of the fake bombs were missed. In addition to the classified report, more recent media reports found that in some cases there were warnings to local security officials about planned covert tests.
TSA said that checkpoints are covertly tested daily by at least four organizations, only half of them managed by the agency. These testers are experts with inside knowledge of the security system and are not subject to all the other layers of security routine travelers pass through on their way to boarding a plane, TSA said.
“Today’s covert testers are the best in the history of aviation in the U.S. and are testing security with items as small as a pen cap,” TSA said.
The security system that failed on 9/11 was “static” and not easily changed whereas today covert testing is one means to allow TSA “to continually raise the bar on security,” the agency said. “In fact, as security officers adapt and begin to consistently discover covert testing methods, testers start all over again, creating more difficult and harder- to-detect tests. This year’s long game of cat and mouse more closely simulates real terrorist probing and operations and keeps officers alert and informed of the latest techniques and improvements.”
Some of the types of testing done today include the random superimposition of images of bombs and related components into travelers’ real carry-on bags on the X-Ray monitor viewed by a security screener. This is done to evaluate the screeners and improve their performance, TSA said. In other tests, fake bombs, bomb parts and other threats are put on testers, their carry-on and checked bags and introduced into the security system.
Another set of testing, managed by TSA’s Office of Inspections, involves the training of testers “in the latest methods of smuggling bombs, bomb parts and weapons through checkpoints using techniques acquired by national and international intelligence partners and gathered through years of experience,” TSA said. For these tests, only after they have begun are the local TSA security officials made aware of the ongoing tests. “After testing is complete, agents unveil the tests and discuss results with officers and local officials so that training may be improved,” TSA said.
It’s these challenging tests that help improve the effectiveness of the security system, TSA said.