A new report by the Defense Department’s top weapons tester shows the Navy appeared to drag its feet when planning for an unmanned Aegis self-defense test ship (SDTS), requiring direction by the office of the Secretary of Defense.

The new 2017 annual report by the Defense Department’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) said that on Nov. 21, 2016 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to fully fund the Aegis SDTS and aerial targets required to test the DDG-51 Flight III, Raytheon [RTN] Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), and Raytheon Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 2 programs.

Aegis BMD Photo: Missile Defense Agency
Aegis BMD
Photo: Missile Defense Agency

Although the Navy at first complied with the direction, it later removed all funding for the Aegis SDTS and aerial targets, the DOT&E report said.

Then, on May 4, 2017, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense told the Navy to reinstate the funding for the SDTS and associated equipment in compliance with the earlier guidance. The report noted, “the Navy has not yet reinstated the funding.”

The Navy currently has only one SDTS, the former Spruance-class destroyer ex-Paul F. Foster (DDG-964).

The service is developing the Flight III DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer to upgrade several aspects of the ship, notably upgrading the Lockheed Martin [LMT] AN/SPY-1 missile defense radar to the more powerful AMDR for enhanced detecting capabilities as well as upgrading electric generation and power conversion facilities to support the AMDR.

Lockheed Martin also builds the Aegis Combat System (ACS) that tracks and guides interceptors to targets.

Additionally, the ESSM medium-range ship-launched self-defense missile is a 13-country cooperatively developed missile. It is designed to eliminate anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface, and low-velocity air threats.

ESSM Block 1 is currently in service as a semi-active-guided missile. Block 2 is in development and is aimed at providing semi-active radar guidance and active radar guidance.

DOT&E argued that without the SDTS, the Navy’s operational test program for the AMDR, Aegis Combat System (ACS), ESSM Block 2, and overall Flight III destroyer programs “will not be adequate to fully assess their capabilities,” especially those focused on self-defense.

The report said the cost of building and operating an Aegis SDTS is estimated at about $350 million. It compared this to the $14 billion price tag of AMDR development and procurement and $45 billion for the 22 Flight III destroyers planned for acquisition.

It also noted the Flight III is expected to protect ships costing about $450 billion total in new ship construction over the next 30 years.

The future Arleigh Burke-class USS Ralph Johnson (DDG-114) guided-missile destroyer during builder’s seat trials in the Gulf of Mexico. (Photo: U.S. Navy)
The future Arleigh Burke-class USS Ralph Johnson (DDG-114) guided-missile destroyer during builder’s seat trials in the Gulf of Mexico. (Photo: U.S. Navy)

“Failure to adequately test the self-defense capability of DDG-51 Flight III destroyers means their survivability and that of a significant number other of ships the DDG-51 Flight III destroyers are intended to defend will be unknown.”

The report said it is essential the Navy now fund the tests, targets, and ACS equipment needed to conduct realistic self-defense tests using an SDTS.

It recommended the Navy fully fund the SDTS, modify the Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs) for these systems to include a SDTS testing phase, comply with Deputy Secretary of Defense directions along these lines, and program fundsi n Future Years Defense Plan to complete all of the activities and procurement needed to conduct adequate Flight III testing.

The DOT&E underscored without the SDTS the test programs cannot adequately test several Navy-approved Flight III, AMDR, ACS, and ESSBM Block 2 requirements, including:

  • The AMDR Capability Development Document (CDD) requires the system to support simultaneous defense against multiple ballistic missile threats and multiple advanced ASCM threats as well as a minimum track range requirement;
  • The Flight III’s survivability key performance parameter is directly tied to meeting a self-defense requirement threshold against ASCMs; and
  • the ESSM Block 2 CDD requires it provide self-defense against incoming ASCM threats in both clear and jamming environments as well as include a minimum intercept range parameter.

The weapons testers noted the Navy cannot use manned ships for operational testing of threat-representative ASCM surrogates in a close-in self-defense battlespace because of Navy safety restrictions. The targets and debris from intercepts “pose an unacceptable risk to personnel at close ranges where some engagement will take place,” the report said.

However, it said Aegis uses the ESSMs in the close-in, self-defense space and understanding the weapon’s performance is critical to understanding the self-defense capabilities of the Flight III destroyer.

DOT&E said without an SDTS with AMDR and the Aegis Combat System “there will not be a way to gather all of the operationally realistic live fire test data needed for comparison to accredit the M&S (Air Warfare/Ship Self-Defense Enterprise Modeling and Simulation) test bed.”