The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to mandate a low cost approach in addressing standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concerning flightdeck door monitoring and ‘discreet’ crew alerting. The plan of action was revealed as pilots continue to lobby for installation of so-called “secondary barriers” on commercial transports that would create a “secure zone” in the immediate vicinity of the cockpit door.
In mid-August, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that outlines how the U.S. aviation agency intends to comply with a 2002 ICAO mandate for a means by which cabin crew of Part 121 commercial passenger aircraft can discreetly notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. ICAO also said “means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot’s station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to identify persons requesting entry.”
The FAA drafted the NPRM after reviewing comments received over the past two years from air carriers, pilot and flight attendant unions and electronics manufacturers. The aviation agency will accept additional comments through Oct. 15, 2007 at which time it intends to finalize its deliberation and give industry two years to comply from the date a final rule is adopted. It said this strategy should give industry sufficient time to consider various options, rather than require the industry to focus solely on one possible option to meet a more immediate implementation date.
The FAA said much has been put in place since the events of Sept. 11, 2001 when terrorists hijacked jetliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania. Flightdeck doors have been hardened. More Air Marshals are riding ‘shotgun’ on commercial transports and some pilots are packing pistols just in case.
A Rapid Response Team made up of government, industry and union representatives said there must be a method for immediate notification of a potential threat in the cabin. The RRT said “consideration should be given to systems that might be installed in the aircraft as well as a device that could be carried by a crew member.”
Regarding video monitoring of the flightdeck area, the RRT said that video cameras “may add value” but the team added that placement of a monitor in an already cramped flight deck would be a challenge. “We have no consensus on whether or how to proceed with this technology.”
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) said the FAA may develop and implement methods to use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots of problems in the cabin. It also said the aviation agency may revise the procedures by which cabin crews can notify pilots of security breaches and other emergencies, including providing for the installation of switches or other devices or methods in an aircraft cabin to enable cabin crews to discreetly notify the pilots of a problem in the cabin.
The Homeland Security Act amended the ATSA, saying that air carriers must provide flight attendants with “a discreet, hands-free, wireless method of communicating with the pilots.”
The FAA interprets the phrase “a means to monitor” as allowing two options: a video system or a cockpit door peephole coupled with an audio confirmation that the door area is clear. It said both methods are acceptable, meeting ICAO’s intent.
At the same time, the FAA believes that current, onboard interphones with FAA-approved alerting procedures will meet ICAO requirements. For example, subtly keying of the interphone in a specific manner could be used. The FAA will not mandate use of hands-free wireless alerting devices, but said air carriers could use FAA-approved devices if they chose.
The Air Transport Association (ATA) agrees with the FAA’s thinking on both counts, saying that member air carriers have already spent billions of dollars to beef up aviation security. “A requirement to retrofit airplanes with separate flightdeck alerting systems or to use wireless, handheld notification devices is unnecessary and not justified by airline experiences. In view of existing, proven communications procedures and systems, wireless handheld devices would not provide additional meaningful security.
“Considering other concerns about handheld devices, such as their susceptibility to unauthorized/inadvertent use and possible interference with onboard communications systems, these devices would not provide a sufficiently reliable means to alert the flightcrew of suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin,” said ATA, adding that several member airlines already have in place FAA-approved procedures to “discreetly” notify the cockpit of problems in the cabin.
ATA also believes video monitoring systems are not necessary and too expensive, but ATA said some members still might install them voluntarily.
The Association of Professional Flight Attendants “strongly supports the need for hands-free wireless communications devices, which is not available through the current aircraft interphone systems.” APFA said flight attendants spend much of their time in aircraft aisles away from interphones located in service galleys and near their jump seats. “A flight attendant who suspects a security breach and is working in the cabin could potentially be half the distance of the aircraft away from notifying the flight crew of the threat,” APFA officials stated.
Security breaches since 9/11 “have confirmed the need for a wireless communications device. Real-time, discreet and hands-free communications devices to communicate with each cabin crew, flight crew and possibly federal Air Marshals, are essential. The cabin interphone system may have been sufficient when originally installed, but the need for instantaneous communications is now needed,” APFA believes.
APFA says a wireless “panic button” can also be beneficial in other types of emergencies, such as smoke/fire in the cabin, medical emergencies, injuries due to turbulence and passenger misconduct.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) has been a staunch supporter of a visual means to monitor the area outside the flightdeck door, but doesn’t support any particular compliance option. But it says any visual means must be tied to an audio confirmation that it’s safe to come out of the cockpit.
The pilots union said interphone systems do not provide a discreet secure communications capability. “Current systems can easily be disabled and monitored, restricting the ability of cabin crewmembers to warn the flightdeck of hostile activities occurring within the cabin. In addition, use of the interphone is very observable, particularly in times of duress.
“Cabin crewmembers need to have an alternative, discreet ability to warn the flightdeck of dangerous situations. ALPA has recommended installation of a concealed switch in the cabin, enabling airline personnel to discreetly notify the flightdeck that a security breach is occurring.” ATA added.
Peter Stokes, the chief executive of STG Aerospace, a British company that makes emergency lighting systems and emergency power systems, such as the Wireless Emergency Primary Power System (WEPPS), for commercial transports, is “disappointed” in the FAA’s decision not to mandate discreet wireless crew alerting systems for use in the cabin.
His firm has spent the past four years developing wireless devices able to move data around the inside of a civil transport without interfering with onboard avionics. Stokes said the Cabin Alert and Monitoring System (CAMS) is fully developed, but that production is on hold until a voluntary market develops after STG Aerospace gains a supplemental type certificate (STC) for the device. He admits, however, that without an FAA mandate, many airlines won’t outfit their flight attendants with the safety device. “It’s probably callous to say, but money is a big issue here,” said Stokes.
Stokes has polled those affected by the pending rule and hopes that protests from those most affected will cause a change of heart within the FAA. But he isn’t optimistic. “The FAA has “disregarded or at best scantily covered the unions wishes,” he believes.
The CAMS wireless device is donut-shaped, about 1.5 inches in diameter and 3/8tth of an inch thick and easily fits in a pocket. It can be activated by pressing either side. The signal goes to a panel in the cockpit that emits an audible alarm. CAMS gives the pilots the specific location of the trouble on an LCD display. CAMS will work in all parts of the cabin, including lavatories and service galleys.
Stokes said CAMS emits an ultra low power transmission that would be undetectable by a sophisticated terrorist onboard who might be monitoring communications between the cabin and flightdeck crew.
A CAMS system for a regional jet would cost about $5,000 while a Boeing 747-400 could be outfitted for $9,000. Stokes estimates that it would cost $30 million to install CAMS on the entire U.S. fleet affected by the rulemaking.
Meanwhile, Global ePoint, a leading manufacturer of security technologies for the aviation, law enforcement, commercial and industrial markets, says its aviation division, Global AirWorks, continues to anticipate increased demand internationally for its Cockpit Door Surveillance System (CDSS) despite the recent FAA ruling that makes flightdeck video monitoring optional for U.S. Airlines.”This is a rule that Global AirWorks had been eagerly anticipating for the past five years,” states Global ePoint President and CEO Daryl Gates. “We believed, that in order to comply with today’s international standards … and in accordance with the NPRM as written … that a video monitoring device would be required.”
He noted that the NPRM does allow passenger airlines to make the decision on whether an alternative method such as a peephole is adequate for a visual assessment, or whether video monitoring is necessary to make a proper assessment by the pilot in charge.
“Global AirWorks contends that video monitoring from the pilot’s station provides a far safer and more secure solution for monitoring the area outside the flightdeck door than other simpler alternatives. The peephole as a means of visual assessment can easily be defeated by any number of means,” Gates adds.
“While we are disappointed with the FAA’s ruling for video monitoring systems, we hope many airlines within the United States will opt for the video monitoring systems, just as they have opted for other means available to them to ensure the safety of the flying public,” observes Gates.
“Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, Canada and more recently India and Thailand have all mandated video monitoring systems and we believe there remains a very substantial opportunity for our CDSS system internationally as Governing Authorities of numerous nations and countries worldwide continue to provide stricter adherence to the standards provided by the ICAO,” he added.
“Since Global AirWorks has installed over 800 CDSS systems worldwide, the company is well positioned for future contracts as these foreign mandates continue to be implemented and applied,” Gates stated. “So, given the foreign mandates and with U.S. airlines having the option to install adequate visual equipment…overall, the prospects for this company’s future are still extremely bright.”
The need for “secondary barriers” is an issue outside of the NPRM, but is no less controversial. Pilots say they need the barriers because they are vulnerable for short periods of time during flights when they go to the lavatory, get meals or, on long flights, change out crews.
Currently, flight attendants sometimes block the aisle with beverage carts to prevent terrorists from rushing the cockpit when the door is opened albeit briefly. Pilots say food and beverage carts do not provide a satisfactory barrier and should not be viewed as a viable, long-term solution.
ALPA believes relatively inexpensive lightweight mesh barriers should be installed on all passenger and all-cargo airliners.
“The FAA should mandate procedures that provide for the establishing of a defined ‘secure zone’ in the immediate vicinity of the flightdeck door any time the door must be opened during flight. The area comprising the ‘secure zone’ would first be confirmed clear of all non-crewmembers and then protected during flightdeck door opening and crew transition. This should be accomplished through a combination of cabin personnel and secondary barriers,” ALPA believes.